Dialectics of nature

Juan Inigo jinigo at inscri.org.ar
Tue Aug 8 20:24:33 MDT 1995

Lisa Rogers writes:

>And then there's been all the general
>talk about "science after the revolution" which some people claim
>will be different, although they can't tell how.

If Lisa is really awaiting for someone to explain her how "science will be
after the revolution", she is really in a hopeless wait from a scientific
point of view. For, such a way of setting out the real question concerning
the form of science and revolution, turns this question into a pure

The present-day true point concerning scientific method and revolution is
the form that science needs to take as the concrete form of the regulation
of the proletariat's conscious revolutionary action, in which the necessity
of capital to annihilate itself into the general conscious regulation of
social life takes shape in its realization as a historical process.

Since I have developed this point along the posts I presented to the list,
I will only synthesize it here once more under the form of a couple of
questions: Is it possible that a scientific method that is determined as a
concrete form of the alienation of human consciousness in capital to stop
at the appearances of the real forms (as _representation_ unavoidably does
according to its own definition) be itself the form of a science that needs
to overcome any appearance to become the general regulator of the
intentional action of the freely, that is, consciously, associated
individuals? Or is it that this conscious revolutionary action needs to
rule itself by overcoming any appearance through the _reproduction_ in
thought of its own necessity, and therefore, of the determinations of the
rest of the real forms it is going to act upon?

But maybe Lisa believes that the question of scientific method as a
necessary form of revolutionary action is only an abstract matter that does
not concern her as a scientist. After all, she never answered some concrete
questions I directly addressed her concerning some quotations from Marx
where he explicitly opposes his scientific method of "reproducing the
concrete through the path of thought" to representation, or where he
defines "the only materialistic and, therefore, scientific method" in a way
that is meaningless from the point of view of representation. (Not to
mention Marx's critique of logic, the formal essence of any representation,
as the necessary form of "the alienated thought," I presented in another
post). To synthesize the point here, I will reproduce a short part of that
post, which included a quotation from a previous post by Lisa:

>Or have you concluded that it is just another example of
>>a lot of
>>abstract talk, or talk about things in utterly abstract terms, such as the
>>very idea of talking about "science" in general, that have limited usefulness
>>to me.?
>But, if this is the case, when the scientific method Marx uses according to his
>own definition is at stake, doesn't calling oneself a "student of Marx" becomes
>an abstraction? My answer is no; it is a specific concrete form that the
>alienation of human consciousness as a potency of capital needs to take by
>representing itself as an abstractly free consciousness.

And just to look at the point from yet another perspective, let us consider
Lisa's assertion:

>Surely, neither the nature, number and relations of
>subatomic particles, nor the choice of analytical focus within
>evolutionary biology need have much relevance to workers' struggles
>for a better society.

Instead of making Lisa wait for some abstract example about the future, let
us place her point of view in the past. Let us place it in 1611-34 in
Florence and Rome. Then, she could have said

"Surely, neither the nature, number and relations of
the _moons of Jupiter_, nor the choice of analytical focus within
_astronomy_ need have much relevance to _the bourgeois'_ struggles
for a better society."

Of course, the Catholic Church, the quintessence of feudal society, had
quite more clear ideas about how it was actually about an ongoing
revolutionary change in the organization of society, and condemned Galileo
for heresy.

Hasn't Lisa ever thought about the possibility that subatomic particles are
not the elementary components of matter, but the ideal representations
(through their relations of measure) of some specific determinations of
matter in which this one develops its simplest necessity, historically
determined by the image of society as formed by mutually independent
individuals inherent in commodity-production? Idealistically inverted and
all, dialectics allowed Hegel to do it almost 200 years ago.

Juan Inigo
jinigo at inscri.org.ar

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