Reply to Schwartz

Philip Goldstein pgold at strauss.udel.edu
Mon Jan 30 06:56:43 MST 1995


	In reply to Wolf, Schwartz makes the following point, which I
find confusing: "The reasonable interpretation is that
beliefs are warranted only by other beliefs and none have independent
warrant in virtue of self-evidence or some other such property. (This is
what _I_ mean by antifoundationalism.) But nothing follows from this
about the status of what some of the beliefs are about: beliefs warranted
by others could be about an objective mind-and-language independent
reality. The unreasonable interpretation is that beliefs can only be
_about_ other beliefs (and so not about a mind, etc. independent reality.)
But it doesn't even follow from _that_ that there is no such reality, just
that we can't have beliefs about it." I take the point to be that, from
the fact that beliefs are warranted by others, one cannot conclude that
there is no objective reality, since some of these warranted beliefs
could include claims about objective reality. The trouble is that one
usually speaks of objective reality as a ground or warrant of beliefs and
, moreover, one that resists what others believe. To concede that what
warrants claims about reality is the beliefs of others is to deny
objective reality just that normative status which antifoundationalism
opposes. In other words, I do not see how your defense of objective
reality as warranted belief supports your opposition to
antifoundationalism.

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