Why dialectics?

fellini at keynes.econ.utah.edu fellini at keynes.econ.utah.edu
Mon Mar 6 12:58:44 MST 1995



On Fri, 3 Mar 1995, Juan Inigo wrote, of Fellini's assertion about
Bhaskar:

>
> I would have preferred to answer this assertion by following Bhaskar's
> developments until uncovering the social necessity he personifies, that
> makes him present scientific cognition (and, therefore, conscious action)
> as unavoidably rooted in its very negation, i.e., philosophy. But I'm still
> completely short of time, so I can only get into the discussion by quoting
> parts of my work that are directly related to it:
>
> Reality, matter, has the self-affirming by means of self-negation - the
> necessity of self-determining, contradiction - as its general form. Hence,
> each natural concrete form (and therefore, each natural form specifically
> developed as a social one) is the realized necessity of its abstract forms
> in their becoming, from the simplest one (matter as such), to one that
> negates itself as such concrete form (realized necessity) affirming itself
> as a potency (a necessity to be realized), whether this necessity is a
> simple immediate one, a necessity developed into its specific form of a
> possibility or a possibility mediated in its realization by possibility
> itself .

Juan, I don't have a problem with your interpretation, but still I have a
question (assuming, of course, that I understand your point). Do you
have an account of the reality, or matter, so that we can understand these
'potencies' as 'necessities to be realized'? If you have such an account
about the necessities in the (material) reality, then your writings
makes sense to me. (As far as I can see, Bhaskar has such an account
explaining 'natural necessity', as the potentialities or tendencies, not
'potencies', to be realized because of the very constitution of
'things', without forgetting that the reality is essentially 'open',
there are no 'constant conjunctions' with which we can explain the
empirical reality. Of course it is quite possible that he is wrong.)

On the other hand, related to this, I have a hard time with the idea that
people should be considered as "personifications of some social
necessities", for it seems to reject 'free will' or intentional human
agency. Are you saying something similar to the (Spinozist) idea that
'freedom is the knowledge of the necessity (or the laws of nature)'?

Regards,

Fellini


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