Interview with Peruvian General Sinecio Jarama (Part II

Vladimir Bilenkin "achekhov at unity.ncsu.edu" at ncsu.edu
Thu Sep 26 20:02:16 MDT 1996


I think I am beginning to get it. The key to everything
else is the new concept of revolutionary war.  Military
action is entirely subordinate to political one. It is
only a scaffolding for a revolutionary organization of
SOCIETY.  And as we don't want from our scaffolds anything
but a bare minimum necessary to support the construction of
the building, so THIS concept of revolutionary war implies
only the necessary minimum of military action proper.

Now, this concept also includes that of the state, which
is the state in the making, the state on the move, so to
speak. The process of revolutionary war then is nothing
else but the growing of a new social organization WITHIN
the womb of the old. The scaffolds fall, and behold...a
new Revolutionary State unfolded!  That's it!

This opens up a very different prospective on the
problematics of the state; at least, very different from
that faced by Lenin.

Now, even putting aside for a time this monumental vision
in its entirety, this concept of revolutionary strategy
deserves a most careful study re its applicability elsewhere.
I'm thinking, of course, of Russian situation which I know
better than anything else. One problem that I can see now
is that such strategy seem to presuppose the existence of
sufficiently autonomous anclaves within the country to serve
as operating bases, the "backbone."

In the first part of his interview,
the General put considerable emphasis on the fragmented socio-
cultural composition of the Peruvian society (his laments about
the Spaniards and the lack of a unified national space). Russia
does have such space, though the process of fragmentation (economic,
administrative, and political) has set in. I have to give more
thought to this subject.

In any case, the concept of the armed strike or other type of
action can and must be introduced to industrial action in Russia.
Could you describe what it involves and give a concrete example
of an armed strike?  After 1905, Russian Maximalists used
industrial and agrarian forms of terror.  But this was something
different. Above all, these acts were not integrated into a
strategic POLITICAL plan.  No wonder they had no lasting
political effect and only helped reaction.

Strategy and plan is everything. Now, the question is what
OBJECTIVE conditions of Pruvian society and the state in their
internal and international relations made it possible to
develop a strategy and a plan that could be acted upon for
over 16 years? (If the General is right in saying that the
"Shining Path has not abandoned anything"). Such long term
strategy and plan seem to be viable only under condition
that the ruling class will not be able to provide a strategic
response to an insurgency, i.e. to deeply reconstruct social
relations and achieve relative economic prosperity.  Unless,
of course,  such strategy and plan imply the concept of
preventing any strategic response of this sort. Actually,
I see now how certain measures can seriously counteract
even a substantial attempt from the outside to help
the regime in developing such initiative.

There are some other and more concrete themes, like relations
between PCP and the peasantry ("forcible process"), and
especially, the new shantytown proletariat. which I would like to
address. But it's a bit too early. Let's listen to the General some
more.

Adolfovich, just keep translating!
This is all increadably interesting and important.
I'd like to write about this for Russian comrades.

Vladimir


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