Fwd: [stachkom-inter] Tense Stand-off as Vyborg Workers Capture Boss

Macdonald Stainsby mstainsby at SPAMhotmail.com
Fri Oct 15 03:38:51 MDT 1999

In case anyone needs some "good" news...
>from International Solidarity with Workers in Russia - ISWoR at aol.com
>ISWoR web-site  -  http://members.aol.com/ISWoR/english/index.html
>Tense Stand-off as Vyborg Workers Capture Boss
>Update 14 Oct 99  mid-afternoon
>This morning's report detailed how armed police had stormed into the Vyborg
>Paper and Pulp Mill, Sovietskii (near Scandinavian border), shooting at the
>workers who were in occupation. Latest reports indicate that eleven workers
>were injured, two by gunfire.  The police had barricaded themselves into a
>section of the building and taken several workers hostage, including one of
>the injured, refusing to admit any medical personnel or journalists.
>during the afternoon, the workers responded by seizing Sabodazh, boss of
>Alcem (British-based company which owns the mill), who received light
>injuries during the incident. They soon released him for medical treatment.
>Meanwhile the workers taken hostage have been released by the Spetsnaz and
>are now undergoing medical examination. The hundreds of workers present on
>the mill grounds, though surrounded by police, have refused to leave until
>the special ("Spetsnaz") armed police unit which attacked them is removed
>from inside the building.
>The strike committee of the mill asks to send protests to
>Prime-minister Vladimir Putin
>Moscow, Krasnopresnenskaya nab. 2
>The Speaker of the State Duma Gennady Seleznev
>Fax:  +7 (095) 292-94-64.
>The Governor of Leningrad Region Valery Serdiukov
>Fax:  +7 (812)  271-56-27; 274-85-39
>The Press Secretary A. Veretin
>Fax:  +7 (812) 110-78-41. E-mail: lobl at mail.lanck.net
>The President's Representative G. Potapchenko
>Tel/fax:  +7 (812) 274-08-25
>You may e-mail your protest copy directly to Russian campaigners at
>mgo at aha.ru
>with copy to us to us at e-mail     ISWoR at aol.com
>Background information can be found on ISWoR website at URL
>Workers of All Countries, Unite!

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From: "Macdonald Stainsby" <mstainsby at hotmail.com>
To: marxism at lists.panix.com,
        Leninist-international at buo319b.econ.utah.edu,
        Marxist-activist at e-groups.com
Subject: Fwd: Taiwan/China
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 1999 02:44:24 PDT
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>* U.N Special Envoy Back in Myanmar
>* Iraq: Sanctions to be Lifted, Inspections to Resume
>* In-Depth Report on Kosovo
>Global Intelligence Update
>October 15, 1999
>Taiwan "Misunderstanding" May Be Intentional
>Following the Taiwanese earthquake, Chinese statements
>have dramatically decreased in militancy, emphasizing connections
>between the mainland and the island. Taiwan's response has been to
>propose the resumption of talks. There has been no Chinese comment
>on the response. It is likely that Taiwan has intentionally
>"misunderstood" recent Chinese signals. Whatever the case, a
>resumption of dialogue would benefit both sides.
>Koo Chen-fu, Taiwan's unofficial envoy to China, tried
>Oct. 14 to call in a year-old promise by his Chinese counterpart to
>visit the island.  Asserting that "goodwill and mutual trust"
>should power relations between Beijing and Taipei, Koo stated that
>differences in defining the status of Taiwan should not be allowed
>to hamper unofficial dialogue.  Koo even proposed that he visit the
>mainland instead, due to his respect for Wang, who is older.
>Koo's statements come on the heels of Chinese diplomatic posturing
>that emphasized the connections between the mainland and the
>Taiwanese people, despite the squabbling between the governments.
>While this is a fairly consistent theme in Chinese foreign policy,
>Taiwan's response is new. Koo seems to be intentionally
>misinterpreting China's post-Earthquake paternalism to give both
>countries an excuse to renew talks.
>In the aftermath of Taiwan's earthquake, Chinese statements toward
>the island have softened to a somewhat paternal attitude.  Though
>never backing down from the goal of reunification, Chinese
>government officials have repeatedly expressed their sympathy and
>connection to the people of Taiwan. On Oct. 14, the Chinese Red
>Cross emphasized the separation between earthquake aid and
>politics. To Beijing this was not a deviation, as it claims that
>Taiwan is a province; China would send aid and support to any of
>its provinces. It would logically follow that China should be open
>to Koo's gesture, since he is - at least, to Beijing - one of its
>In the past week, the Chinese government has accepted nonofficial
>visits from several Taiwanese citizens, reinforcing its connection
>to the "province's" people.  Yesterday, Jiang Zemin met a
>delegation of female entrepreneurs from Taiwan.  Last week, a
>Taiwanese basketball star signed with a Chinese team.  While
>neither of these are groundbreaking moves - as China sees all the
>above as its citizens - they have symbolic value.  One of the first
>breakthroughs in U.S.-China relations came with an exchange of
>ping-pong teams.
>Koo is the chairman of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF),
>an unofficial body authorized to handle cross-straits exchanges in
>the absence of official ties between the nations. Exactly a year
>ago, Koo made an historic visit to the mainland where he was
>received by Wang Daohan, the head of the Beijing-based Association
>for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and China's top
>envoy to Taiwan.  In what was hailed as a major diplomatic move,
>Wang promised to reciprocate Koo's visit.
>While it is possible that Koo's request was motivated by the one-
>year anniversary of Wang's promise, he appears to be interpreting
>China's recent statements as an invitation to renew talks.  Both
>the SEF and ARATS are officially "private" institutions with no
>connections to their home governments.  Unofficially, however, they
>are the main diplomatic channels between Beijing and Taipei, and
>are responsible for bilateral negotiations.
>We believe that Koo is intentionally misinterpreting recent Chinese
>moves in an effort to re-establish a dialogue with the mainland.
>Continued talks between Beijing and Taipei are in Taiwan's
>interest, as Taiwan is unlikely to join the mainland and China is
>unlikely act militarily in the midst of "normal" relations. Lurking
>in the background is the Dec. 19 handover of Macau from Portugal to
>China.  After that, the only piece of China still not unified will
>be Taiwan.  China has made it clear that after Macau is restored to
>the nation, it will focus its attention on Taiwan. Therefore,
>increased Chinese ties and improved relationships are in Taiwan's
>This intentional "misunderstanding" may elicit a Chinese response,
>as negotiations work to Beijing's benefit as well.  While the
>possibility of eventual unification through negotiations is slim,
>military action, even against symbolic targets like Taiwan's
>outlying islands, will bring down a chorus of international
>criticism.  The reactions may impede Beijing's economic ties or its
>diplomatic goals, like joining the World Trade Organization.  The
>alternative, to play along with Taiwan's "mistake," holds benefits
>for both sides.
>(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.

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