FW: [SANET-MG] Wishes on a dark day (fwd)

Craven, Jim jcraven at clark.edu
Fri Sep 14 17:33:02 MDT 2001



-----Original Message-----
From: Marilyn Davis [mailto:marilyn at deliberate.com]
Sent: Friday, September 14, 2001 4:12 PM
To: warriornet at lists.speakeasy.org
Subject: Re: [SANET-MG] Wishes on a dark day (fwd)




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2001 02:18:43 +0200
From: geno at ZAP.A2000.NL
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group
    <SANET-MG at LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU>
To: SANET-MG at LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Subject: Re: [SANET-MG] Wishes on a dark day

With due respect for all the victims of this extreme acts of violence,
I still think real evidence is needed before attacking.
Besides, the article below shows the heavy US involvement in
establishing the Taliban in power.

Wytze de Lange


On 14 Sep 2001, at 6:39, Euro Master wrote:

WHO IS OUSMANE BIN LADEN?

by Michel Chossudovsky

Professor of Economics,
University of Ottawa

Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG) at
http:/globalresearch.ca.
The  url of this article is
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO109C.html
Posted 12 September 2001

A few hours after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre
and
the Pentagon, the Bush administration concluded without
supporting
evidence, that "Ousmane bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation
were
prime suspects".

CIA Director George Tenet stated that bin Laden has the capacity
to
plan "multiple attacks with little or no warning." Secretary of State
Colin Powell called the attacks "an act of war" and President Bush
confirmed in an evening televised address to the Nation that he
would
"make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these
acts
and those who harbour them". Former CIA Director James Woolsey pointed
his finger at "state sponsorship," implying the complicity of one or
more foreign governments.

In the words of former National Security Adviser, Lawrence
Eagleburger, "I think we will show when we get attacked like this, we
are terrible in our strength and in our retribution."

Meanwhile, parroting official statements, the Western media mantra has
approved the launching of "punitive actions" directed against civilian
targets in the Middle East. In the words of William Saffire writing in
the New York Times: "When we reasonably determine our attackers' bases
and camps, we must pulverize them - minimizing but accepting the risk
of collateral damage - and act overtly or covertly to destabilize
terror's national hosts".

The following text outlines the history of Ousmane Bin Laden and the
links of the Islamic "Jihad" to the formulation of US foreign policy
during the Cold War and its aftermath.

Prime suspect in the New York and Washington terrorists attacks,
branded by the FBI as an "international terrorist" for his role in the
African US embassy bombings, Saudi born Ousmane bin Laden was
recruited during the Soviet-Afghan war "ironically under the auspices
of the CIA, to fight Soviet invaders". 1

In 1979 "the largest covert operation in the history of the CIA"  was
launched in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support
of the pro-Communist government of Babrak Kamal.2:

"With the active encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan's ISI [Inter
Services Intelligence], who wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a
global war waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet Union, some
35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined Afghanistan's
fight between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to study in
Pakistani madrasahs. Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim
radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad."3

The Islamic "jihad" was supported by the United States and Saudi
Arabia with a significant part of the funding generated from the
Golden Crescent drug trade:

"In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Decision
Directive 166,...[which] authorize[d] stepped-up covert military aid
to the mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a
new goal: to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action
and encourage a Soviet withdrawal. The new covert U.S. assistance
began with a dramatic increase in arms supplies -- a steady rise to
65,000 tons annually by 1987, ... as well as a "ceaseless stream" of
CIA and Pentagon specialists who travelled to the secret headquarters
of Pakistan's ISI on the main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There
the CIA specialists met with Pakistani intelligence officers to help
plan operations for the Afghan rebels."4

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using Pakistan's military Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) played a key role in training the
Mujahideen.

In turn, the CIA sponsored guerrilla training was integrated with the
teachings of Islam:

"Predominant themes were that Islam was a complete socio-political
ideology, that holy Islam was being violated by the atheistic Soviet
troops, and that the Islamic people of Afghanistan should reassert
their independence by overthrowing the leftist Afghan regime propped
up by Moscow."5

PAKISTAN'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS

Pakistan's ISI was used as a "go-between". The CIA covert support to
the "jihad" operated indirectly through the Pakistani ISI, - i.e. the
CIA did not channel its support directly to the Mujahideen. In other
words, for these covert operations to be "successful", Washington was
careful not to reveal the ultimate objective of the "jihad", which
consisted in destroying the Soviet Union.

In the words of CIA's Milton Beardman "We didn't train Arabs". Yet
according to Abdel Monam Saidali, of the Al-aram Center for Strategic
Studies in Cairo, bin Laden and the "Afghan Arabs" had been imparted
"with very sophisticated types of training that was allowed to them by
the CIA" 6

CIA's Beardman confirmed, in this regard, that Ousmane bin Laden was
not aware of the role he was playing on behalf of Washington. In the
words of bin Laden (quoted by Beardman): "neither I, nor my brothers
saw evidence of American help".7

Motivated by nationalism and religious fervor, the Islamic warriors
were unaware that they were fighting the Soviet Army on behalf of
Uncle Sam. While there were contacts at the upper levels of the
intelligence hierarchy, Islamic rebel leaders in theatre had no
contacts with Washington or the CIA.

With CIA backing and the funneling of massive amounts of US military
aid, the Pakistani ISI had developed into a "parallel structure
wielding enormous power over all aspects of government". 8

The ISI had a staff composed of military and intelligence officers,
bureaucrats, undercover agents and informers, estimated at 150,000. 9

Meanwhile, CIA operations had also reinforced the Pakistani military
regime led by General Zia Ul Haq:

"Relations between the CIA and the ISI [Pakistan's military
intelligence] had grown increasingly warm following [General] Zia's
ouster of Bhutto and the advent of the military regime,'... During
most of the Afghan war, Pakistan was more aggressively anti-Soviet
than even the United States. Soon after the Soviet military invaded
Afghanistan in 1980, Zia [ul Haq] sent his ISI chief to destabilize
the Soviet Central Asian states. The CIA only agreed to this plan in
October 1984.... `the CIA was more cautious than the Pakistanis.' Both
Pakistan and the United States took the line of deception on
Afghanistan with a public posture of negotiating a settlement while
privately agreeing that military escalation was the best course."10

THE GOLDEN CRESCENT DRUG TRIANGLE

The history of the drug trade in Central Asia is
intimately related to the CIA's covert operations.
Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, opium production in
Afghanistan and Pakistan was directed to small regional markets. There
was no local production of heroin. 11

In this regard, Alfred McCoy's study confirms that within two years of
the onslaught of the CIA operation in Afghanistan, "the Pakistan-
Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top heroin producer,
supplying 60 percent of U.S. demand. In Pakistan, the heroin-addict
population went from near zero in 1979... to 1.2 million by 1985 - a
much steeper rise than in any other nation":12

"CIA assets again controlled this heroin trade. As the Mujahideen
guerrillas seized territory inside Afghanistan, they ordered peasants
to plant opium as a revolutionary tax. Across the border in Pakistan,
Afghan leaders and local syndicates under the protection of Pakistan
Intelligence operated hundreds of heroin laboratories. During this
decade of wide-open drug-dealing, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in
Islamabad failed to instigate major seizures or arrests ... U.S.
officials had refused to investigate charges of heroin dealing by its
Afghan allies `because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been
subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there.'

In 1995, the former CIA director of the Afghan operation, Charles
Cogan, admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug war to fight
the Cold War. `Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible
to the Soviets. We didn't really have the resources or the time to
devote to an investigation of the drug trade,'... `I don't think that
we need to apologize for this. Every situation has its fallout....
There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective was
accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.'"13

IN THE WAKE OF THE COLD WAR

In the wake of the Cold War, the Central Asian region is not only
strategic for its extensive oil reserves, it also produces three
quarters of the World's opium representing multi-billion dollar
revenues to business syndicates, financial institutions, intelligence
agencies and organized crime.

The annual proceeds of the Golden Crescent drug trade (between 100 and
200 billion dollars) represents approximately one third of the
Worldwide annual turnover of narcotics, estimated by the United
Nations to be of the order of $500 billion.14

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a new surge in opium
production has unfolded. (According to UN estimates, the production of
opium in Afghanistan in 1998-99 - coinciding with the build-up of
armed insurgencies in the former Soviet republics - reached a record
high of 4600 metric tons.15 Powerful business syndicates in the former
Soviet Union allied with organized crime are competing for the
strategic control over the heroin routes.

The ISI's extensive intelligence military-network
was not dismantled in the wake of the Cold War. The
CIA continued to support the Islamic "jihad" out of
Pakistan. New undercover initiatives were set in
motion in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the
Balkans. Pakistan's military and intelligence
apparatus essentially "served as a catalyst for the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence
of six new Muslim republics in Central Asia." 16.

Meanwhile, Islamic missionaries of the Wahhabi sect
from Saudi Arabia had established themselves in the
Muslim republics as well as within the Russian
federation encroaching upon the institutions of the
secular State. Despite its anti-American ideology,
Islamic fundamentalism was largely serving Washington's strategic
interests in the former Soviet Union.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989,
the civil war in Afghanistan continued unabated. The
Taliban were being supported by the Pakistani Deobandis and their
political party the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). In 1993, JUI
entered the government coalition of Prime Minister Benazzir Bhutto.
Ties between JUI, the Army and ISI were established. In 1995, with the
downfall of the Hezb-I-Islami Hektmatyar government in Kabul, the
Taliban not only instated a hardline Islamic government, they also
"handed control of training camps in Afghanistan over to JUI
factions..." 17

And the JUI with the support of the Saudi Wahhabi
movements played a key role in recruiting volunteers
to fight in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.

Jane Defense Weekly confirms in this regard that
"half of Taliban manpower and equipment originate[d]
in Pakistan under the ISI" 18 In fact, it would
appear that following the Soviet withdrawal both
sides in the Afghan civil war continued to receive
covert support through Pakistan's ISI. 19

In other words, backed by Pakistan's military
intelligence (ISI) which in turn was controlled by
the CIA, the Taliban Islamic State was largely
serving American geopolitical interests. The Golden
Crescent drug trade was also being used to finance
and equip the Bosnian Muslim Army (starting in the
early 1990s) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

In last few months there is evidence that Mujahideen
mercenaries are fighting in the ranks of KLA-NLA
terrorists in their assaults into Macedonia.

No doubt, this explains why Washington has closed
its eyes on the reign of terror imposed by the
Taliban including the blatant derogation of women's
rights, the closing down of schools for girls, the
dismissal of women employees from government offices
and the enforcement of "the Sharia laws of punishment".20

THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

With regard to Chechnya, the main rebel leaders
Shamil Basayev and Al Khattab were trained and
indoctrinated in CIA sponsored camps in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. According to Yossef Bodansky, director
of the U.S. Congress's Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional Warfare, the war in Chechnya had been
planned during a secret summit of HizbAllah
International held in 1996 in Mogadishu, Somalia. 21

The summit, was attended by Osama bin Laden and high-ranking Iranian
and Pakistani intelligence officers. In this regard, the involvement
of Pakistan's ISI in Chechnya "goes far beyond supplying the Chechens
with weapons and expertise: the ISI and its radical Islamic proxies
are actually calling the shots in this war". 22

Russia's main pipeline route transits through Chechnya and Dagestan.
Despite Washington's perfunctory condemnation of Islamic terrorism,
the indirect beneficiaries of the Chechen war are the Anglo-American
oil conglomerates which are vying for control over oil resources and
pipeline corridors out of the Caspian Sea basin.

The two main Chechen rebel armies (respectively led
by Commander Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab)
estimated at 35,000 strong were supported by
Pakistan's ISI, which also played a key role in
organizing and training the Chechen rebel army:

"[In 1994] the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence
arranged for Basayev and his trusted lieutenants to
undergo intensive Islamic indoctrination and
training in guerrilla warfare in the Khost province
of Afghanistan at Amir Muawia camp, set up in the
early 1980s by the CIA and ISI and run by famous
Afghani warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In July 1994,
upon graduating from Amir Muawia, Basayev was
transferred to Markaz-i-Dawar camp in Pakistan to
undergo training in advanced guerrilla tactics. In
Pakistan, Basayev met the highest ranking Pakistani
military and intelligence officers: Minister of
Defense General Aftab Shahban Mirani, Minister of

Interior General Naserullah Babar, and the head of
the ISI branch in charge of supporting Islamic
causes, General Javed Ashraf, (all now retired).
High-level connections soon proved very useful to
Basayev.23

Following his training and indoctrination stint,
Basayev was assigned to lead the assault against
Russian federal troops in the first Chechen war in
1995. His organization had also developed extensive
links to criminal syndicates in Moscow as well as
ties to Albanian organized crime and the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). In 1997-98, according to
Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) "Chechen
warlords started buying up real estate in Kosovo...
through several real estate firms registered as a
cover in Yugoslavia" 24

Basayev's organisation has also been involved in a
number of rackets including narcotics, illegal tapping and sabotage of
Russia's oil pipelines, kidnapping, prostitution, trade in counterfeit
dollars and the smuggling of nuclear materials (See Mafia linked to
Albania's collapsed pyramids, 25

Alongside the extensive laundering of drug money,
the proceeds of various illicit activities have been
funneled towards the recruitment of mercenaries and
the purchase of weapons.

During his training in Afghanistan, Shamil Basayev
linked up with Saudi born veteran Mujahideen
Commander "Al Khattab" who had fought as a volunteer
in Afghanistan. Barely a few months after Basayev's
return to Grozny, Khattab was invited (early 1995)
to set up an army base in Chechnya for the training
of Mujahideen fighters. According to the BBC, Khattab's posting to
Chechnya had been "arranged through the Saudi-Arabian based
[International] Islamic Relief Organisation, a militant religious
organisation, funded by mosques and rich individuals which channeled
funds into Chechnya".26

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since the Cold War era, Washington has consciously
supported Ousmane bin Laden, while at same time
placing him on the FBI's "most wanted list" as the
World's foremost terrorist.
While the Mujahideen are busy fighting America's war
in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, the FBI
 - operating as a US-based Police Force - is waging a
domestic war against terrorism, operating in some
respects independently of the CIA which has - since
the Soviet-Afghan war - supported international
terrorism through its covert operations.

In a cruel irony, while the Islamic jihad - featured
by the Bush Adminstration as "a threat to America" - is blamed for the
terrorist assaults on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, these
same Islamic organisations constitute a key instrument of US
military-intelligence operations in the Balkans and the former Soviet
Union.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, the truth must prevail to prevent the
Bush Adminstration together with its NATO partners
from embarking upon a military adventure which
threatens the future of humanity.

ENDNOTES

Hugh Davies, International: `Informers' point the
finger at bin Laden; Washington on alert for suicide
bombers, The Daily Telegraph, London, 24 August
1998.

See Fred Halliday, "The Un-great game: the Country
that lost the Cold War, Afghanistan, New Republic,
25 March 1996):

Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,
Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999.

Steve Coll, Washington Post, July 19, 1992.

Dilip Hiro, Fallout from the Afghan Jihad, Inter
Press Services, 21 November 1995.

Weekend Sunday (NPR); Eric Weiner, Ted Clark; 16
August 1998. Ibid.

Dipankar Banerjee; Possible Connection of ISI With
Drug Industry, India Abroad, 2 December 1994.
Ibid

See Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside
Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, Oxford university Press, New York,
1995. See also the review of Cordovez and Harrison in International
Press Services, 22 August 1995.

Alfred McCoy, Drug fallout: the CIA's Forty Year
Complicity in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive;
1 August 1997.
Ibid

Ibid.

Douglas Keh, Drug Money in a changing World,
Technical document no 4, 1998, Vienna UNDCP, p. 4.
See also Report of the International Narcotics
Control Board for 1999, E/INCB/1999/1 United Nations
Publication, Vienna 1999, p 49-51, And Richard
Lapper, UN Fears Growth of Heroin Trade, Financial
Times, 24 February 2000.

Report of the International Narcotics Control Board,
op cit, p 49-51, see also Richard Lapper, op. cit.

International Press Services, 22 August 1995.

Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,
Foreign Affairs, November- December, 1999, p. 22.

Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 3 September
1998)

Tim McGirk, Kabul learns to live with its bearded
conquerors, The Independent, London, 6 November1996.

See K. Subrahmanyam, Pakistan is Pursuing Asian
Goals, India Abroad, 3 November 1995.

Levon Sevunts, Who's calling the shots?: Chechen
conflict finds Islamic roots in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, 23 The Gazette, Montreal, 26 October
1999..

Ibid

Ibid.

See Vitaly Romanov and Viktor Yadukha, Chechen Front
Moves To Kosovo Segodnia, Moscow, 23 Feb 2000.

The European, 13 February 1997, See also Itar-Tass,
4-5 January 2000. BBC, 29 September 1999).

The URL of this article is:
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO109C.html

Copyright Michel Chossudovsky, Montreal, September
2001. All rights reserved. Centre for Research on
Globalisation at http://globalresearch.ca.
Permission is granted to post this text on
non-commercial community internet sites, provided
the source and the URL are indicated, the essay
remains intact and the copyright note is displayed.
To publish this text in printed and/or other forms,
including commercial internet sites and excerpts,
contact the author at chossudovsky at videotron.ca,
fax: 1-514-4256224.

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