Chinese economic realities

Louis Proyect lnp3 at
Sun Jul 7 12:15:17 MDT 2002

    China's disguised failure

Published: July 4 2002 7:55 | Last Updated: July 4 2002 7:55

The debate that is gaining steam over the accuracy of China's growth
figures for the past few years is far more than a matter of technical
quibbles among statisticians. Rather, it marks the beginning of a
long-overdue reassessment of the successes and failures of Beijing's
reform era - the widely praised attempt at growth and modernisation that
began not long after Mao Zedong's death in 1976.

Last year Thomas Rawski, the American economist, started the argument
with the startling assertion that - official claims of economic growth
rates of more than 7 per cent notwithstanding - China's economy since
1998 might not have been growing at all.

Then, in March, Zhu Rongji, China's premier, seemed to support him when
he said that without massive state pump-priming, the Chinese economy
would have collapsed in 1998 - the very year Mr Rawski singled out.

Other voices have joined the debate since. This year, for example, the
Central Intelligence Agency stated that China was indeed growing - but
at about half the rate that Chinese officials claimed. And the East-West
Center in Hawaii reported recently that China's statistical methods were

Everywhere, it seems, China's economic indicators are being marked down,
causing deep concern and confusion about the prospects for the world's
most populous country. Are we feeling no more than a few bumps on
China's still inevitable ascent to economic greatness? Or are these the
first signals that fundamental flaws may exist in the Chinese approach?

To the visitor, economic vigour seems evident on every street corner.
Scratch the surface, however, and you find unsold goods in the shops and
unemployed people camping on the streets.

One lesson of the collapse of socialism in eastern Europe is that
profitability, not quantity of investment, is the key to sustained
economic growth. Here, arguably, lies China's fundamental problem. There
is no doubt that massive investment is being made - more than $300bn in
foreign direct investment in 20 years, and vastly bigger amounts by the
state. All this shows up as growth because the sums are spent, the
workers are hired and the cement is poured. But what about actual return
in a decade or two? This is much less clear. And what opportunities are
missed by having foreigners and the state in charge, rather than letting
Chinese entrepreneurs do the job? These may be enormous.

Many foreigners think, mistakenly, that China is capitalist. In fact,
China's system is exactly what its leaders call it: socialism with
Chinese characteristics. In practice, that means a large state sector,
party committees even in private enterprises, corporate boards that are
unable to fire managers, no market for corporate control and massive
changes in economic policy (such as consolidation of the motor industry)
dictated without consultation.

Worse still, the system discourages private Chinese entrepreneurship -
the only possible engine for long-term economic growth - while
conferring privilege on foreigners. Indeed, it would be easier to start
a business in China as a US citizen than it would be as an ordinary
Chinese citizen.

Rather than unleash the well known and awesome creativity of private
Chinese business, Beijing has substituted a superficially modern
structure built on foundations that are still socialist. One part is
foreign direct investment - the Taiwan- and Hong Kong-owned
manufacturing around greater Hong Kong, for example, that piles up
China's trade surpluses. Another part is the unprofitable state
industrial sector, kept afloat by loans from state banks, which piles up
irrecoverable debt. The third part is the impoverished countryside, with
its limited links to the modern sector.

The central government's fiscal foundations are similarly questionable.
Although already borrowing to pay its regular deficits, it has
nevertheless signed up for some expensive projects: the Pudong
development in Shanghai, the Olympics, the Three Gorges Dam, weapons
acquisitions and a space programme, to name a few.

Living standards may be rising and production growing, but other things
are rising, too: a mountain of debt, wasted capital and unfunded
liabilities. These were created not under Mao Zedong but under his
reforming successors. Nor does it seem likely that these problems are
going to be tackled soon.

Since 1989, China has been trying hard to avoid the sorts of traumatic
economic and political shocks that brought down communism in the west.
The deep structural changes that have returned those former communist
states to health, however, are as inescapable for China as they were for
Russia. Painful as those reforms were in the west, they will probably
prove even more painful when they finally reach China. And all because
of the errors and wasted opportunities of the misnamed reform era. /

/The writer is professor of international relations at the University of
Pennsylvania and director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise


Louis Proyect

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