Washington violates agreement, forces North Korea's hand, researcher Gregory Elich reveals

Richard Fidler rfidler at cyberus.ca
Wed Jan 1 18:29:50 MST 2003

Targeting North Korea
by Gregory Elich

globalresearch.ca,  31  December/ décembre 2002

For all the ballyhoo surrounding the North Korean admission of a nuclear
weapons program, one salient fact has been overlooked. It never happened. No
North Korean official ever made such a statement. Western news reports
repeated endlessly the claim that a North Korean official admitted to a
nuclear weapons program in an October meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State James Kelly. No evidence was presented other than the Kelly's
assertion. On this matter, the word of the Bush Administration was accepted
as sufficient evidence - the same Bush Administration that has consistently
lied about virtually every issue. But on North Korea its word was sufficient
evidence. If North Korea did not confess to a nuclear weapons program, then
what really happened during that ill-fated October meeting? To understand
what took place in October and the resulting confrontation, events must be
viewed in the broader context of U.S.-North Korean relations and the nuclear
issue. This context is also important for explaining why the Bush
Administration would deliberately mislead the world public, using the
nuclear issue as a pretext for imposing economic and political measures in
an attempt to bring about the collapse of North Korea.

To the Brink of War and Back

The conflict in U.S.-North Korean relations over the nuclear issue first
arose on January 26, 1993, when President Clinton announced that the U.S
military would conduct war games in South Korea. This was followed the next
month by the news that some of the nuclear weapons previously targeted on
the Soviet Union would be redirected at North Korea. By March, the massive
Team Spirit war games involving bombers, cruise missiles and naval vessels
were underway. Interpreting this as a provocation, North Korea responded by
signalling that it would withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). However, talks with U.S. officials in June 1993 led to North Korea
rescinding its stated intention to depart from the NPT. But new difficulties
soon arose when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) insisted on
inspecting undeclared nuclear sites in North Korea, something the agency had
never demanded from any other nation. The demand came at the instigation of
U.S. officials, who had been pressing the IAEA to engage in more intrusive
and wide-ranging inspections, hoping to turn up a pretext for applying
pressure on North Korea and to expand opportunities for gathering
intelligence. At this time, North Korea discovered that IAEA inspectors at
declared nuclear sites in North Korea were passing intelligence to American
officials. (1) Encouraged by news reports whipping up emotional responses,
the Clinton Administration charged that plutonium extracted from North
Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility was being utilized in the development of
nuclear weapons. No evidence for the accusation presented, but it achieved
wide acceptance by dint of repetition.

full: http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI212A.html

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