U.S. Army Baits Ambushers With Own Troops

Craven, Jim jcraven at clark.edu
Thu Jul 10 11:15:21 MDT 2003

Jim Craven wrote:

> During the Tet offensive, Vietnamese forces hit 33 out of 44
> provincial capitals, over 100 towns and cities, took and held for
> awhile poritons of the U.S. embassy in Saigaon,

is their an authoritative account (book) of the VietNam war from the point
of view of the North and the VC? strategy, tactics, etc?


les schaffer

To tell you the truth Les I haven't seen one but I'm sure there are some
available. Some of the writings of Wilfred Burchette at the time gave some
glimpses. I remember vividly an interview Wilfred Burchette gave with Pham
Phan Dong then Premier of the DRV after Tet. He asked the Premier if victory
was certain for the Vietnamese and the Premier said it was certain.
Burchette asked why he thought so and the Premier answered something like:
"Because in the West, they think in terms of days or perhaps months and in
terms of narrow and immediate "success" whereas we think in terms of decades
and in terms of stages and necessary sacrifices toward strategic purposes;
we will win, that is certain."

Tet caused massive reallocations of U.S. Forces to reinforce areas of the
south thus taking away forces from up near the DMZ; it caused wholsesale
terror and fear among the ARVN forces; it caused the REMFs (Rear Echelon
Mother Fuckers) who were running, profiting from and enjoying that War from
Saigon to wonder if anywhere in Vietnam was "safe"; it increased the degree
and scope of political/military coordination between NLF and so-called NVA
forces in the South; it caused traitors in the south to wonder how safe they
could be anywhere in Vietnam; it showed the ability of the Vietnamese to
launch a highly and precisely coordinated offensive against the most
reinforced areas in the south; it exposed the futility and myopia of seeing
and assessing the Vietnam war in "conventional" terms; it exposed the utter
incompetence and duplicity of U.S. intelligence forces in Vietnam in terms
of their own assessments of Vietnamese strengths, forces and orders of

These and other objectives were the calculated objectives of the Vietnamese
for which they understood that they would have to make significant sacifices
in human losses.


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