logical systems (Query about symbolic logic)

Les Schaffer schaffer at optonline.net
Thu Jul 10 18:24:11 MDT 2003

Jim Farmelant:

> Was Zwicky's logic a three-value logic like Reichenbach's?  In that
> case we might have an issue of priority over who developed it
> first. Reichenbach's 1944 book *Philosophic Foundations of Quantum
> Mechanics* makes no mention of Zwicky.

here's what i know so far:

1921   Lukasiewicz    3-valued

       E L Post       m-valued

1930   Lukasiewicz    more m-valued
         & Tarski

1932   Reichenbach    inifinite-valued

1933   Zwicky         suggests 3-valued for QM

a footnote in Eves' book:

   As a mater of historical interest, in 1936 K. Michalsi discovered
   that three-valued logics had actually been anticipated as wearly as
   the fourteeth century by the medieval schoolman, WIlliam of
   Occam. The possibility of a three-valued logic had also been
   considered by the philospher Hegel and, in 1896, by Hugh
   MacColl. These speculations, however, had little effect on
   subsquent thought and so cannot be considered as decisive

i'll check the library soon and see what's up with Zwicky. one of his
bios on the web described him as an eccentric astronomer. if you read
that as academi speak, it could mean he threw lots of interesting
ideas around "haphazardly", and Eves just happened to come across it.

> I remember years ago reading some papers by Patrick Heelan on
> quantum lattice logics.  Heelan is a Jesuit
> priest/physicist/philosopher.

i couldnt find anything on lattices listed on his web page at
georgetown u.

> Well Priest's point is that classical logic is explosive, in that if
> we try to assert both A and not-A simultaneously, then their
> conjunction will logically (via material implication) imply
> anything.  Priest contends that certain scientific theories (such as
> QM) are not explosive in his sense, and so therefore dialetheism and
> paraconsistent logics can be quite legitimately applied to such
> theories.

well, here's a case:

     A            ~A               B
   Lassie is    Lassie is        Lassie is
   a dog        not a dog        a good

now the conjunction:

if {   (Lassie is a dog) and (Lassie is not a dog)  }

  then  (Lassie is a good junkyard guard)

then is always true regardless of whether Lassie makes a good guard!!!
but what is it saying?!?!?!?!?!?!?!

classical material implication is strange. maybe john enyang has time
to pitch something in here.

ok. how about giving a short description now of dialetheism.

les 'is, is not' schaffer

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