Rumsfeld's Rapid Deployment and Special Operations

Charles Jannuzi b_rieux at yahoo.com
Thu Mar 27 09:55:06 MST 2003


Are proving to be anything but rapid or elite.

But here is some info. to keep it all straight,
as this operation is light on armor and artillery
and supposedly packs a rapid, special forces type
wallop.

  The thing to remember about the war is that it
is one that is supposed to showcase 'rapid
deployment' and 'special operations'. Even flying
1000 guys from the 173rd Airborne Brigade into an
already secure airfield in N. Iraq is considered
a 'special operation'. I suppose when Gen. Franks
visits the field latrine, it's a special
operation, too.

OK, it works like this.

US CENTCOM, which came out of the earlier Rapid
Deployment Task Force, draws on various rapid
deployment and special operations assets it
identifies as necessary for meeting its mission.
The two main missions right now would be
Afghanistan and Iraq. In many ways, the Persian
Gulf War I, the Afghanistan campaign, and now
this war are CENTCOM asserting its usefulness to
the strategic interests identified by the
national security council. In other words, if
this war for oil pricing power and profits didn't
exist, CENTCOM would have to go out and lobby
people to make one in order to justify getting
more assets and more billions of dollars of
expenditure.


http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/

For background on how CentCom came about:

http://orbat.com/site/data/vignettes/vignette16.html

Next, for special operations, CentCom gets to
choose from , among others, these choices:

1. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC),
established in 1980,at Pope Air Force Base, North
Carolina and at Fort Bragg, NC. , a joint
headquarters "designed to study special
operations requirements and techniques; ensure
interoperability and equipment standardization;
plan and conduct joint special operations
exercises and training; and develop joint special
operations tactics."

JSOC has tried to justify its bloated budgets and
manning rosters (I think they are over 20,000
personnel now) by pursuing a role in
'anti-terror'. Which makes you wonder what the
freak they were doing when 9-11 happened--looking
for some anti-terror mission to carry out?

2. "Special Operations Command (SOCOM), one of
nine unified combat commands, activated in April
1987 to provide command, control and training for
all special operations forces (SOF) in the United
States. Has approximately 47,000 active, National
Guard and reserve forces. Headquarters is at
MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Components include
the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort
Bragg, N.C.; the Air Force Special Operations
Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla; the Naval Special
Warfare Command, Coronado, Calif., and the Joint
Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. The
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School, the U.S. Air Force Special Operations
School, and the Naval Special Warfare Center are
also assigned to the command."

Elsewhere in the mix is the CIA's SOG, which as I
stated earlier, proved rather anemic in
Afghanistan (were they spies, they couldn't speak
Pashtun; were they soldiers, they couldn't hold
their own in a firefight; were they experts at
anything, if so why did they have to get Rumsfeld
to assign them so many people from the Dept. of
Defense to 'get the job done').


CIA SOG

>>http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=htintel

http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/targets/2003/0126cia.htm

OPPOSITION AND RIVALS

The pentagon is not happy about the SOG's moving
aggressively onto its turf. When aides told
Rumsfeld in late September 2001 that his Army
Green Beret A-Teams couldn't go into Afghanistan
until the CIA contingent there had laid the
groundwork with the local warlords, he erupted,
"I have all these guys under arms, and we've got
to wait like a little bird in a nest for the CIA
to let us go in?" What's more, Rumsfeld,
according to a Pentagon source, does not like the
idea that the CIA's paramilitary operatives could
start fights his forces might have to finish.

The resentment burns even more because the
generals know that when it comes to
special-operations soldiers, they have a deeper
bench than the spooks at Langley. And in
Afghanistan, the Pentagon was regularly asked to
supply the CIA with people from that bench. The
Defense Department already has 44,000 Army, Navy
and Air Force commandos in its U.S. Special
Operations Command, who are as skilled in covert
guerrilla warfare as the CIA's operatives. In the
basement vaults of the command's headquarters at
MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., sit secret
contingency plans to send military special-ops
teams to any trouble spot in the world, complete
with infiltration routes, drop zones,
intelligence contacts and assault points.

The CIA ended up having about 100 officers
roaming in Afghanistan during the U.S. invasion.
But the agency teams were still critically short
of key operatives. "I kept signing more and more
deployment orders for folks to go to the CIA,"
recalls Robert Andrews, who at the time was a
deputy assistant secretary of defense for special
operations. "They were looking for any medics,
operational soldiers and even intelligence
specialists that we had."

Even some old agency hands think the CIA should
stick to intelligence and leave the commando work
to the military. "Agency operators lack the
experience to be effective military operators,"
says Larry Johnson, a former CIA officer and
State Department counterterrorism expert. "They
have just enough training to be dangerous to
themselves and others." And there is the historic
danger that CIA paramilitary operations, cloaked
in layers of secrecy, can become rogues.
"Everybody has seen this movie before where
secret wars have developed into public
disasters," warns John Pike, director of
GlobalSecurity.org, a defense and intelligence
think tank. "We're going to wind up doing things
that, when the American people hear of them, they
will repudiate."

The CIA responds that its commandos take on the
jobs the military can't or won't handle. The SOG
prides itself on being small and agile, capable
of sending teams of 10 operators or fewer
anywhere in the world much faster than the
Pentagon can. One reason the agency was the first
into Afghanistan was that the Special Ops Command
dragged its feet getting its soldiers ready for
action. Intelligence sources tell Time that the
CIA had requested that commandos from the U.S.
Army's elite Delta Force join its first team
going into Afghanistan but that the Pentagon
refused to send them.

Once deployed, CIA operatives have fewer
regulations to hamstring them than their military
counterparts do. In Afghanistan, CIA cargo planes
were dropping warm-weather clothing, saddles and
bales of hay for allied Afghan foot soldiers and
cavalry. One cable that officers in the field
sent back to Langley read, "Please send boots.
The Taliban can hear our flip-flops." Says Kent
Harrington, a former CIA station chief in Asia:
"If a military special-operations soldier
parachuted in with $3 million to buy armies, he'd
have to have a C-5 cargo plane flying behind him
with all the paperwork he'd need to dispense the
money."

The CIA also has far more contacts than the
Pentagon among foreign intelligence services that
can help with clandestine operations overseas,
plus a global network of paid snitches on the
ground. The agency "deals with everything from
bottom feeders around the world to their
governments on a routine basis," says a senior
U.S. intelligence official. "Name a country
anywhere, and (the CIA) can identify with a
couple of telephone calls four or five people who
will have a variety of skills to go into that
country if it becomes a difficult place." Green
Berets can operate covertly in a combat zone, but
they would stick out like sore thumbs if they
tried to infiltrate a foreign city, because they
don't have the intelligence network in place to
conceal themselves. "We have the ability to hide
in plain sight, get in and get out before anybody
figures out who we are," asserts a CIA source.

CIA officials, leery of being sucked into new
scandals, insist that their covert operations are
now subject to layers of oversight. Before an
agency paramilitary team can be launched, the
President must sign an intelligence "finding"
that broadly outlines the operation to be
performed. That finding, along with a more
detailed description of the mission, is sent to
the congressional intelligence committees. If
they object to an operation, they can cut off its
funds the next time the agency's budget comes up.


After approving a covert operation, Bush leaves
the details of when and how to Tenet and his
senior aides. For example, Administration
officials say Bush did not specifically order the
Predator attack in Yemen. But after Sept. 11 he
gave the CIA the green light to use lethal force
against al-Qaeda.

Rumsfeld, nevertheless, is intent on building his
own covert force. He recently ordered the Special
Operations Command to draw up secret plans to
launch attacks against al-Qaeda around the world,
and he intends to put an extra $1 billion in its
budget next year for the job. Elsewhere in the
Defense Department, small, clandestine units,
coordinating little with the CIA, are busy
organizing their own future battles. Several
hundred Army agents, with what was originally
known as the intelligence support activity, train
to infiltrate foreign countries to scout targets.
With headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Va., the unit
is so secretive, it changes its cover name every
six months. Delta Force has a platoon of about
100 intelligence operatives trained to sneak into
a foreign country and radio back last-minute
intelligence before the force's commandos swoop
in for an attack.

The CIA isn't amused. "Don't replicate what you
don't need to replicate," argues a senior U.S.
intelligence officer. So who referees this
dispute? In addition to running the CIA, Tenet,
as director of Central Intelligence, is supposed
to oversee all intelligence programs in the U.S.
government. But the Pentagon, which controls more
than 80% of the estimated $35 billion
intelligence budget, doesn't want him meddling in
its spying.

Ultimately, the man who chooses between them is
the President. Both Tenet and Rumsfeld report
directly to him. And thus far, Bush has been
eager to give Tenet leeway to build up his
commando force. With a major conflict looming in
Iraq, units from all branches of the military are
mobilizing to get a piece of the action. The CIA,
at least, will have its own.<<

Other notes. Since the Reagan era, the US has
repeatedly attempted to hitch the CENTCOM star to
NATO. This war is no different, though France and
Germany proved resistant to the US-UK stooge,
Lord Robertson, this time around.

Moreover, since the new gravy train is 'homeland
security' and 'homeland health' mixed with
'anti-terrorism' and 'finding WMD', there will be
repeated efforts to link all these, too.

Plus see also:

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1302/jsoc.html
(dated but still interesting analysis)

Is JSOC Bloated?
The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC),
headquarters for our military's counterterrorist
units, is a ponderous, largely unneeded
organization in search of a valid mission.

http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/1999/990427bs.pdf

>>The Commanders of the Service Special
Operations Commands?
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict works in a
well-balanced partnership with CINCSOC. The
service component commands are subordinate
commands to USSOCOM and the CINCSOC has a normal
command relationship with these component
commanders. The OASD(SO/LIC), USSOCOM, and
service component command staffs work closely
together in a wide range of activities associated
with the development of the USSOCOM program and
budget, and the research, development, and
acquisition of equipment for SOF. In addition, as
members of the USSOCOM Board of Directors (BOD),
the service component commanders have an
essential role in our partnership to effectively
allocate the precious resources entrusted to
USSOCOM. The BOD, co-chaired by CINCSOC and ASD
(SO/LIC), is the primary USSOCOM resource
decision-making body. If confirmed, I intend to
foster this positive partnership to ensure
effective stewardship of SOF resources.<<

https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf/bf25ab0f47ba5dd785256499006b15a4/1af4860452f962c085256a490049856f/$FILE/Chapter%2022%20-%20Special%20Operations.doc

>>In the mid-eighties, some in Congress became
concerned that DoD had not implemented much of
the Holloway Commission report.  There was a
perception by some in Congress that absent
Congressional involvement, conventional
commanders and civilian leaders in DoD would
never bring SOF up to the level it needed to be.
Some in Congress advocated the establishment of a
sixth service, a new SOF branch of the military.
However, most believed a better plan was to put
together a joint special operations command using
the training and recruiting base of the branches
of service already in being.  As a result, in
1986, Congress passed Public Law 99-661, the
Nunn-Cohen Amendment, codified at 10 U.S.C. §
167.  The U.S. Special Operations Command was now
a reality.
SOF COMMAND STRUCTURE
As a result of 10 U.S.C. § 167, the United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was
established.  This CINC is unique in that it is
the only CINC specifically established by
Congress and required by law.  DoD could, for
example, do away with the Atlantic Command and
reorganize its sub-component units.  However, DoD
does not have the authority to disband USSOCOM.
However, Congress realized that if it created a
CINCSOC without a separate funding authority, DoD
would continue to have tremendous control and the
ability to drawdown SOF assets simply by refusing
to fund its programs.  Therefore, an entirely new
budgetary authority, Major Force Program Eleven
(MFP-11), was established to fund SOF.  Some have
observed that USSOCOM is the only CINC with his
own "checkbook."  This is important for SOF
because MFP-11 funds may only be used for
articles and programs with an SO basis or nexus.
USSOCOM is both a supporting and supported
command.  It is a supporting command in that it
is responsible for providing ready and trained
SOF to the geographic CINCs.  It is a supported
command in that when directed by the National
Command Authority (NCA), it must be capable of
conducting selected SO of a strategic nature
under its own command.  USSOCOM is commanded by a
General and is located at MacDill Air Force Base
in Tampa, Florida.
10 U.S.C. § 167(i) explains that SOF are those
units which are:
1.	Listed in the Joint Capabilities Plan, Annex X
(17 Dec 85);
2.	Listed in the Terms of Reference and
Conceptual Plan for the Joint Special Operations
Command (1 Apr 1986); or
3.	Forces designated by the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF).
Each service in turn has its own specific SO
command.  For the Army, it is the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC), commanded by
a Lieutenant General, at Fort Bragg, NC.  The
Naval SO command is referred to as the Naval
Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWAR), with a Rear
Admiral in charge at Coronado, CA.  The U.S. Air
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is
located at Hurlburt Field, FL and led by a
Lieutenant General. These service specific SO
commands are responsible for selecting, training
and equipping the force.  They are also
responsible for SO doctrine within their
respective services.  In the U.S. Army, USASOC is
a Major Command (MACOM) and therefore, U.S. Army
SOF (ARSOF) is not within the FORSCOM chain of
command.
There is also a Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC), a sub-unified command of USSOCOM, which
is located at Fort Bragg, NC.  This is a joint
command which studies special operations
requirements and techniques, ensures
interoperability and equipment standardization,
plans and conducts joint special operations
exercises and training, and develops joint
special operations tactics.
There are no standing Marine Corps SOF.  Marine
Corps units are not listed in either of the two
SOF designation documents cited in 10 U.S.C. §
167(i).  Neither DoD nor the Marine Corps have
sought to amend those documents, although both
have had the opportunity.  There are however
certain units of the Marine Corps, along with
particular conventional elements of the U.S. Navy
and U.S. Air Force, that have been designated
"special operations capable."  Special operations
capable units are from time to time designated as
SOF by SECDEF for specific operations.  Many
Marine Corps units perform and train to perform
special operations type missions.  The
expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps makes it
particularly well suited as a special operations
capable force.
U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)
include active duty, Army National Guard (ARNG)
and U.S. Army Reserve elements.  There are five
active and two ARNG Special Forces (SF) groups
(SFG).  SF are often referred to in literature
and by the public as the "Green Berets" because
of their distinctive headgear.  These SFG are
under the command of the U.S. Army Special Forces
Command Airborne (USASFC(A)), a sub-command of
USASOC, also located at Fort Bragg, NC.
USASFC(A) is commanded by a Major General, while
each SFG is lead by a Colonel.  Each of the
active SFG has a geographical orientation.  SF
soldiers study the language and culture of the
countries within their area of operations (AOR),
and receive training in a variety of individual
skills and special skills.  These skills include
operations, intelligence, communications, medical
aid, engineering and weapons.  SF soldiers are
highly skilled operators, trainers and teachers.
Not only must they be capable of performing
difficult military missions; they must also be
able to teach these skills to foreign militaries
and domestic agencies as well.
The Ranger Regiment, commanded by a Colonel, and
its three battalions are also ARSOF.  Regimental
headquarters, along with one battalion, are at
Fort Benning, GA.  One other battalion is located
at Hunter Army Airfield in Georgia, and the final
battalion is stationed at Fort Lewis, WA.
Members of the Regiment wear the black beret and
make up a highly responsive strike force.  Ranger
units are specialized airborne infantry troops
that conduct special missions in support of U.S.
national security polices and objectives.
The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment,
commanded by a Colonel and located at Fort
Campbell, KY, provides special aviation support
to ARSOF, using specialized aircraft and highly
trained personnel.  The Civil
Affairs/Psychological Operations Command
(USACAPOC) is based at Fort Bragg, NC.  There are
three reserve CA commands, with nine reserve CA
brigades.  There is one active and two reserve
PSYOPS groups.  CA units support the commander's
relationship with civil authorities and the
civilian population by promoting mission
legitimacy.  PSYOPS units support operations
across the operational continuum to induce or
reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to
the U.S..  The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School is responsible for training
leader development, and doctrine. A Major General
commands this Fort Bragg "special operations
university."  There are also various support
commands within USASOC such as the Special
Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) and the
Special Operations Chemical Reconnaissance
Detachment (CRD).
Because, within ARSOF, SF is the largest piece,
has the most judge advocates assigned, and
because an SFG is unique in terms of
organization, a brief description of an SFG will
follow.  The group is commanded by a Colonel,
with a Lieutenant Colonel Deputy Commanding
Officer (DCO), a Lieutenant Colonel executive
officer (XO) and a Command Sergeant Major (CSM)
forming the remainder of the command group.  The
staff is similar to that of a separate infantry
brigade.  There are three battalions, each
commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, a Group
Support Company (GSC), led by a Major, and a
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)
commanded by a Captain.  There are several
detachments and sections within the GSC such as
the Military Intelligence Detachment (MI DET),
Signal Detachment (SIG DET), Service Detachment
(SVC DET) and the rigger section.  Each of these
detachments are typically commanded by a Captain
and usually have company grade UCMJ authority.
Each battalion has a Major XO and a CSM, along
with the traditional battalion staff.  There are
three operational companies, a battalion support
company and a battalion headquarters detachment
within the battalion.  A SF operational company
command is a Major position and the company has a
SGM rather than a 1st Sergeant.  The company
Headquarters Detachment is often referred to as a
Special Forces Operational Detachment "C" (SFOD
C).  The operational companies have headquarters
detachments (SFOD B).  The operational companies
are further broken down into operational teams,
known as "A" teams or SFOD A's.  An A team is
commanded by a Captain and the XO is a warrant
officer.  The team sergeant, or operations
sergeant, is a Master Sergeant.  There are nine
other enlisted members broken down by MOS.  The
junior member is usually at least a Sergeant E-5
on an SFOD A.  As a general rule, SFOD A
commanders do not have UCMJ jurisdiction over
team members because it has been withheld at the
company level.
USASOC, USASFC(A) and USACAPOC have Offices of
Staff Judge Advocates.  Each SFG, the Ranger
Regiment, PSYOPS Group, CA command, and the John
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School have
command judge advocates.
COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS
As noted above, SO are inherently joint.  SOF
assigned in a theater are under the combatant
command (COCOM) of the geographic CINC.
Moreover, because USSOCOM and its Army
sub-component are supporting commands, in most
instances, when SOF deploy overseas, they are
under the operational control (OPCON) of the
combatant command for the geographic area in
which they are operating.  Further, each
warfighting CINC has a Special Operations Command
(SOC).  SOF in theater are under the operational
control (OPCON) of the SOC.  For example, the
Special Operations Command for the Commander and
Chief of the Pacific is referred to as SOCPAC.
Usually these SOCs are commanded by a one star
General or Admiral.  Recently, judge advocate's
have been assigned to some of these SOCs.
In an operation, the SOC may order the
establishment of a Joint Special Operations Task
Force (JSOTF).  Generally speaking, the JSOTF
commander will either be the SOC or the service
SOF with the largest presence in the AOR.  A
JSOTF is a temporary joint SOF headquarters
established to control more than one service
specific SOF or to accomplish a specific mission.
 If augmented by foreign units, the designation
becomes Combined Joint Special Operations Task
Force or a Combined Unconventional Warfare Task
Force (CUWTF).  In order to synchronize SO with
land and maritime operations with conventional
units, a Special Operations Command and Control
Element (SOCCE) is often established.  It
collocates with the supported conventional
forces. The SOCCE can receive operational,
intelligence, and target acquisition reports
directly from deployed SOF and provides them to
the supported component.  The Special Operations
Coordination Element (SOCOORD) is the primary SOF
advisor to an Army corps or Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) with regard to SOF integration.  The
SOCOORD normally is a staff element within the G3
or J3 staff section.<<

For info as to how that actually worked out in
this build up and deployment, see:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/n02062003_200302062.html


U.S. Central Command Build-up Continues
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6, 2003 -- The U.S. military
build-up in the U.S. Central Command area of
operations continues, with more than 100,000
troops now serving in the region, DoD officials
said.

The CENTCOM region sprawls from Kazakhstan to
Kenya. The troop total includes some 9,000
personnel involved in operations in Afghanistan
and thousands of others deployed to countries
around that theater of operations, the officials
said.

The largest Army unit to deploy to the area is
the 3rd Infantry Division out of Forts Stewart
and Benning in Georgia. That unit is in Kuwait.
Other Army units, most notably the 4th Infantry
Division at Fort Hood, Texas, have received
deployment orders.

There are 35,000 Marines in the area of
operations. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
has 15,000 Marines in Kuwait. Roughly 7,200
Marines are aboard Amphibious Task Force East,
and 5,000 others are aboard the Amphibious Task
Force West. Thousands of sailors man the ships
carrying the Marines.

The Navy has deployed the USS Constellation and
USS Abraham Lincoln carrier battle groups to the
Central Command area of operations. They're in
the Arabian Sea area and are part of Central
Command's 5th Fleet. Each group has 8,500 to
10,000 sailors aboard. The USS Harry S. Truman
carrier battle group is in the Mediterranean Sea
as part of 6th Fleet in the U.S. European Command
area of operations.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt has finished training
in the Caribbean and is transiting in support of
the global war on terrorism, Navy officials said.


The Air Force has deployed 17,850 airmen to the
region. Of those, 1,725 are Air National
Guardsmen and 625 are Air Force Reserve members.
Air Force officials would not comment on the
types and number of aircraft deployed to the
region.












__________________________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Platinum - Watch CBS' NCAA March Madness, live on your desktop!
http://platinum.yahoo.com

~~~~~~~
PLEASE clip all extraneous text before replying to a message.



More information about the Marxism mailing list