Iran's Khamenei nixes rapprochement with US

bon moun sherrynstan at
Thu May 15 05:21:26 MDT 2003

>Armed resistance might well be the last
>alternative of the Iraqi people.

It also might be nearly the first, as seems to be the case now.  But
establishing organization and logistics for such an effort, not to
mention development of chains of command and-or lines of communication
between various groupings might give the appearance that not much is
going on.

>However at the moment it is obvious that  the possibility is there for
>urban guerrilla campaign.  As I have said before the principal military

>weakness of the American position is that they do not have a
>intelligence network.  That will take some time to implement.  Nor do
>even have sufficient Arab speak counter insurgency experts I suspect.
>will develop all this but in the mean time they will  present a lot of
>targets to the Iraqis.

At them moment, I suspect WE (like on this list) don't have decent
intelligence, and that's why it's so hard to predict even the outlines
of a resistance, which I feel certain is being developed.  Said the same
thing about the Taliban, when everyone claimed they were "defeated."

The weakness of the American intelligence apparatus, IMO, is that it is
both TOO sophisticated and it gets its inputs from a 22-year-old kid
with a head full of half-assed, crackpot indoctrination from the
geniuses that prepare intelligence summaries.  The over-reliance on
technology (to the point now where software is substituted for
intuition) has reduced intel types to machine operators (what I've
started to call the organic composition of the military) is a distinct
weakness that can be overcome in the way that Van Riper did last year
when he defeated the US in a war simulation by resorting to distinctly
lo-tech solutions - like communicating through messengers on Yamahas or
codes called out from the minarets.  The development of old-fashioned
John LeCarre/Falcon and the Snowman tradecraft (non-tech commo) will
give Iraqi resisters an insurmountable advantage over the Americans.  As
you point out, they are largely dependent on interpreters who will cling
pretty closely to American skirts.  Day-to-day activity, the mine from
which intel must interpolate, is filtered through GI's spot reports and
daily summaries, who have no idea what the significance is of most of
what they see.  The other essential element for any resistance, as
alluded to, is to 'blind' the US occupiers by waging a ruthless campaign
against collaborators.

>Should a guerrilla war break out then every effort will have to be made
>close Iraq's borders. that could well include the DMZ option. Something

>which may not be achievable without a great deal of expense.  How many
>troops will be needed to "keep the peace" in Iraq?

Right you are.  DMZ's require someone to sit on them.  But political
realities assist the US in the short term, limiting direct support for
the time being probably to Syria - which accounts for the kind of saber
rattling we heard at the end of the last major push.

My own notion, but it is obviously based on categories familiar to me,
with little understanding of the culture, is that outside support would
not be essential to tangle up the Americans.  They seem pretty tangled
up already.  But 500 decent marksmen with a mission to inflict one
casualty every 2 weeks - hitting from just outside defense perimeters
then melting back into the urban bustle - could create a situation where
the Americans withdraw deeper and deeper into hardened positions,
leaving opposition forces ever greater freedom to move around and
organize.  The beauty of guerrilla action against occupiers is that done
correctly, the Gs can always retain the initiative - which IMO is the
most critical intangible in warfare.

>The other glaring weakness is that the US has yet to come up with an
>administration which they can reasonably hide behind. This in turn will

>make the current consensus within the US itself difficult to sustain.

The consistent blind spot of US militarists has been their absolute
inability to comprehend the political dimension of war.  Combined with
hubris, this is the equivalent of working around machinery with big
rings on your fingers.

>So the fools have rushed into Iraq.  They will now find it much harder
>get out.

When Baby Bush was at Daddy's knee, learning about how Granddad helped
the Nazis, he should have been listening to 'Uncle Remus' folklore -
especially Tar Baby.

More information about the Marxism mailing list