[Marxism] Indo-US Nuclear Deal in Dutch Parliament

Sukla Sen suklasenp at yahoo.co.uk
Wed Aug 29 04:17:48 MDT 2007

For those who can read Dutch here is a link to the
original answers:

http://www.minbuza. nl/nl/actueel/ brievenparlement
,2007/08/ Beantwoording- vragen-lid- Van-Velzen-
over-een- nucle.html

The following is unauthorised translation.

Questions by member Van Velzen (SP) to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs
regarding a nuclear treaty between the United States
and India ( tabled 13 August 2007)

Answer to questions by member van Velzen regarding a
nuclear agreement between the United States and India.
DVB/NN-414/07 27 augustus 2007

Have you noted the 'Agreement for cooperation between
the government of the United States of America and the
government of India concerning peaceful uses of
nuclear energy (123 agreement)'? 1) If so, do you
that this treaty makes no mention of the return of the
nuclear material and equipment as described in the
treaty? If not, why not?
Do you agree that this treaty provides for the forming
of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel? If so, do you
agree that this would strongly reduces the possibility
of directed sanctions against the Indian nuclear
programme if nuclear tests take place or IAEA rules
(International Atomic Energy Agency) are violated? If
not, why not?

Yes, I have noted the 'Agreement for cooperation
between the government of the United States of America
and the government of India concerning peaceful uses
of nuclear energy'. Neither the details of the
negotiations between the United States and India, nor
the motivations which led to the final negotiated
result, are known to me. A number of stipulations in
the treaty, including those dealing with the
termination of the treaty and the acquisition of
nuclear fuel, is not clear as of this moment. Further
explanation by the treaty parties involved is
necessary for a complete understanding of the treaty.
After that a comprehensive analysis of the treaty in
question can be made.

Do you agree that delivery of nuclear fuel to India
for civilian purposes will allow the country to free
its own limited supplies for its nuclear weapons
programme? If not, can you explain why not? If yes,
how do you evaluate this?

Yes, I am also of the opinion that the delivery of
nuclear fuel (and uranium) for civil purposes will
allow India to free its own limited uranium stockpile
for the production of fissile materials for the
nuclear weapons programme. As was pointed out by my
predecessor in his letter of 5 July 2006
(parliamentary ref 21 501-02, nr. 692), this is a
matter of concern for the Netherlands, which has in
diplomatic contacts
with India and the United states repeatedly stated our
preference for India to declare a moratorium on the
production of fissile materials for explosive
purposes. India in turn has repeatedly informed us
that it is
not planning to declare a unilateral moratorium, but
that it is prepared to work in a multilateral
framework on the realisation of a fissile materials
cut-off treaty. This fact forms an extra encouragement
the Netherlands to continue its efforts for the
initiation of negotiations on such a treaty.

4. Do you agree that the so-called 123 Agreement
undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty? If not, why
not? Do you furthermore agree with me that by making
India an exception this treaty undermines any
position taken regarding any other (possible)
proliferating states?
Do you agree that this treaty contradicts statements
by the head of the IAEA Al Baradei, declaring that
states with nuclear weapons must take ongoing
disarmament steps, permanently end nuclear testing
subject to
the law, as well as cease production of nuclear
material for weapons? 2)

As stated in my reply to questions 1 and 2, I am not
as of this moment able to make a comprehensive
analysis of the treaty. Furthermore a fullscope
safeguards agreement still to be agreed on between
India and
the IAEA will form a crucial part of the nuclear
arrangements between the US and India. An analysis of
the treaty and the fullscope safeguards agreement is
necessary in order to give a comprehensive evaluation
of the possible effects of the civil nuclear
cooperation between India and the US.
In general the position taken in relation to nuclear
weapons states and (possible) proliferating states is
evaluated on a case by case basis, taking into account
the specific merits.

Do you agree that the guidelines of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) imply that trade with countries
which do not allow security inspections by the IAEA,
is illegal? If so, do you agree with me that the
NSG guidelines prevent implementation of the US-India
treaty being referred to? If not, why not? If yes, can
you indicate how the Netherlands will react to an
(American) proposal to adjust the NSG guidelines in
such a way that implementation of the treaty would no
longer violate the guidelines?

The NSG guidelines determine that for deliveries of
sensitive nuclear goods and technologies (the 'Trigger
List' )(3) to non-nuclear weapons states to take
place, the receiving country must have signed a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, that is to say, it
must allow IAEA inspections on all of its territory.
For the delivery of nuclear-related dual use materials
and technologies this strict rule does not apply. (4)
Since India is not an official nuclear weapons state
(5) and has not signed a fullscope safeguards
agreements with the IAEA, the treaty in question can
indeed not be implemented without adjustment of the
present NSG guidelines. As was already stated by my
predecessor in his letter of 19 April 2006
(parliamentary ref 21 502-02, nr.681), the planned
civil nuclear cooperation with India contains positive
elements, such as the further embedment of India in
the global non-proliferation system and the subjection
of a significant part of its nuclear activities to
supervision. The nuclear agreement also meets part of
the fast-growing Indian energy needs, without using
fossil fuels. That is why the Netherlands is prepared
to take a positive position in the NSG, when
possible American proposals to adjust the NSG
guidelines, are discussed. Our point of departure is
that the decision to be taken must be in accordance
with our non-proliferation commitments.

1) http://www.state. gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2007/ aug/90050.
2) http://www.armscont rol.org/events/ 20061114_
India_Transcript .asp
[3] See document IAEA INFCIRC/254/ Part 1
[4] See document IAEA INFCIRC/254/ Part 2
[5] China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom,
United States.

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