[Marxism] Indo-US Nuclear Deal: India-US-China Triangle

Sukla Sen suklasenp at yahoo.co.uk
Mon Oct 15 12:37:47 MDT 2007


Nuclear Weapons, Criminal States, and the US-India

Noam Chomsky

Nuclear-armed states are criminal states. They have a
legal obligation, confirmed by the World Court, to
live up to Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, which calls on them to carry out good-faith
negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.
None of the nuclear states has lived up to it.

The United States is a leading violator, especially
the Bush administration, which even has stated that it
isn't subject to Article 6.

On July 27, Washington entered into an agreement with
India that guts the central part of the NPT, though
there remains substantial opposition in both
countries. India, like Israel and Pakistan (but unlike
Iran), is not an NPT signatory, and has developed
nuclear weapons outside the treaty. With this new
agreement, the Bush
administration effectively endorses and facilitates
this outlaw behaviour. The agreement violates US law,
and bypasses the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45
nations that have established strict rules to
lessen the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control
Association, observes that the agreement doesn't bar
further Indian nuclear testing and, "incredibly, ...
commits Washington to help New Delhi secure fuel
supplies from other countries even if India resumes
testing." It also permits India to "free up its
limited domestic supplies for bomb production." All
these steps are in direct violation of international
nonproliferation agreements.

The Indo-US agreement is likely to prompt others to
break the rules as well. Pakistan is reported to be
building a plutonium production reactor for nuclear
weapons, apparently beginning a more advanced
phase of weapons design. Israel, the regional nuclear
superpower, has been lobbying Congress for privileges
similar to India's, and has approached the Nuclear
Suppliers Group with requests for exemption from its
rules. Now France, Russia and Australia have moved to
pursue nuclear deals with India, as China has with
Pakistan - hardly a surprise, once the global
superpower has opened the door.

The Indo-US deal mixes military and commercial
motives. Nuclear weapons specialist Gary Milhollin
noted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's testimony
to Congress that the agreement was "crafted with the
private sector firmly in mind," particularly
aircraft and reactors and, Milhollin stresses,
military aircraft. By undermining the barriers against
nuclear war, he adds, the agreement not only increases
regional tensions but also "may hasten the day when a
nuclear explosion destroys an American city."
message is that "export controls are less important to
the United States than money" - that is, profits for
US corporations - whatever the potential threat.
Kimball points out that the United States is granting
India "terms of nuclear trade more favourable than
those for
states that have assumed all the obligations and
responsibilities" of the NPT. In most of the world,
few can fail to see the cynicism. Washington rewards
allies and clients that ignore the NPT rules entirely,
while threatening war against Iran, which is not known
have violated the NPT, despite extreme provocation:
The United States has occupied two of Iran's
neighbours and openly sought to overthrow the Iranian
regime since it broke free of US control in 1979.

Over the past few years, India and Pakistan have made
strides towards easing the tensions between the two
countries. People-to-people contacts have increased
and the governments are in discussion over the many
outstanding issues that divide the two states. Those
promising developments may well be reversed by the
Indo-US nuclear deal. One of the means to build
confidence throughout the region was the creation of a
natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan
into India. The "peace pipeline" would have tied the
region together and opened the possibilities for
further peaceful integration.

The pipeline, and the hope it offers, might become a
casualty of the Indo-US agreement, which Washington
sees as a measure to isolate its Iranian enemy by
offering India nuclear power in exchange for Iranian
gas - though in fact India would gain only a fraction
of what Iran could provide.

The Indo-US deal continues the pattern of Washington's
taking every measure to isolate Iran. In 2006, the US
Congress passed the Hyde Act, which specifically
demanded that the US government "secure India's full
and active participation in United States efforts to
dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and
contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction."

It is noteworthy that the great majority of Americans
- and Iranians - favour converting the entire region
to a nuclear-weapons free zone, including Iran and
Israel. One may also recall that UN Security Council
Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, to which Washington
regularly appealed when seeking justification for its
invasion of
Iraq, calls for "establishing in the Middle East a
zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all
missiles for their delivery."

Clearly, ways to mitigate current crises aren't

This Indo-US agreement richly deserves to be derailed.
The threat of nuclear war is extremely serious, and
growing, and part of the reason is that the nuclear
states - led by the United States - simply refuse
to live up to their obligations or are significantly
violating them, this latest effort being another step
toward disaster.

The US Congress gets a chance to weigh in on this deal
after the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group vet it. Perhaps Congress,
reflecting a citizenry fed up with nuclear
gamesmanship, can reject the agreement. A better way
to go forward is to pursue the need for global nuclear
disarmament, recognising that the very survival of the
species is at stake.

Noam Chomsky's most recent book is Interventions, a
collection of his commentary pieces. Chomsky is
emeritus professor of linguistics and philosophy at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

This article appeared in the Khaleej Times on October
8, and at Japan Focus on October 8, 2007.


The Turnaround in Sino-Indian Relations

Tarique Niazi

Many observers have recently argued that the newly
forged Indo-U.S. alliance will work against its
“intended aims of Chinese encirclement.” [1] Although
India denies its part in any attempt at “Chinese
containment” to the publicly acknowledged satisfaction
of China, [2] the theory nevertheless persists.
China’s response to the Indo-U.S. alliance is,
however, quite creative. Instead of reacting with
alarm, Beijing has gone on a charm offensive to draw
New Delhi into a triangular entente among China, India
and Russia. India, which has languished under foreign
subjugation for centuries, has a visceral aversion to
strategic alliances with world powers. Since its
independence in 1947, it has followed what could be
described as the “Third Way” in world diplomacy, which
manifested itself in the birth of the Non-aligned
Movement (NAM) in the 1950s. China is now building
bridges to India based in part on the latter’s
instinctive wariness of foreign influences, which is
evident in India’s homegrown opposition to its nuclear
deal with the U.S.

Most surprisingly, India has been warmly receptive to
Chinese overtures to form a triangulation of regional
entente. Since President Bush’s landmark visit to New
Delhi in March 2006, which laid the foundation for
exceptional cooperation between Washington and New
Delhi in civilian uses of nuclear technology, India
has received the highest-level visits by the Chinese
President Hu Jintao in November 2006 and the Russian
President Vladimir Putin in January 2007. If anything,
these exchanges demonstrate that the Indo-U.S.
alliance has brought China, India and Russia ever
closer. As a co-architect of this entente, China has
embarked on a threefold strategy to bring India into
its fold. First, it is reordering its relationship
with Pakistan that has long been seen in India as its
counterbalance. Second, it is deepening economic ties
and speedily resolving the lingering border disputes
with India. Third, it is developing, with Russia in
the lead, a triangulation of strategic alliance among
the three nations to build a “multipolar world,” that
is to check U.S. hegemonic impulses.[3] As will be
spelled out below, Indians are appreciatively
responsive to the Chinese threefold strategy.

Reordering Sino-Pakistani Relations

China’s relations with South Asia have long been
frozen in the rivalry between India and Pakistan. With
the turn of the millennium, however, Beijing has
initiated a thaw. It has since warmed towards India,
while at the same time maintaining its special
relationship with Pakistan. Observers believe that
Chinese President Hu Jintao is now taking Sino-Indian
amity to the next level. His visit to India and
Pakistan on November 21-26, 2006 epitomized the future
shape of Sino-Indian relations, signaling a marked
shift in Beijing’s long-held view of New Delhi as a
potential rival. The first sign of Beijing’s changing
vision became apparent when Hu chose India over
Pakistan for his first stop during his week-long visit
to South Asia. This was a stunning reversal in the
45-year-old tradition of Chinese leaders who have been
making Pakistan their first destination on their
official trips to South Asia. Also, the change in Hu’s
itinerary helped defuse the sense of offense among
Indians at the fact that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s
10-day visit to the region in April 2005 took him
first to Islamabad rather than New Delhi. Having
swapped Islamabad for New Delhi, Hu recognized India’s
place in the sun. This symbolic move heartened India’s
nationalist elites, who often decry Beijing’s tilt
towards Islamabad.

Beyond symbols, Hu took substantial steps to straddle
the chasm between India and Pakistan and thus fashion
a new approach to South Asia that is consistent with
what he described as “the changing global scenario”
and “the situation in the region.” [4] Three such
steps that signal a shift, especially, in the Chinese
approach to India stand out. First, Hu assured New
Delhi that Beijing would not stand in the way if the
former made a go at the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) seat. Many Indians resent China’s
putative obstructionist role to spoil their country’s
prospects for a place on the UNSC. Yet just as many
Indians attribute Beijing’s resistance to their
country’s bid to India’s alliance with Japan, rather
than to the Indian bid itself. [5] Hu’s renewed
assurances of support for India’s future bid will
infuse Indians of all stripes with new hope for their
country’s entrée into the UNSC.

Second, during his stay in New Delhi and Islamabad, Hu
carefully kept the K-word off his agenda. This was the
first time in the past 45 years that a Chinese leader
distanced himself from his country’s enduring
pro-Pakistan position on the disputed territory of
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), which continues to be
contested between India and Pakistan. Indians
certainly took heart at the omission of Kashmir from
Hu’s statements and speeches. Hu, instead, offered to
help broker peace in the region. A negotiated
settlement of the Kashmir dispute will greatly
unburden Beijing of the need for “balancing acts” –
between India and Pakistan – while facilitating its
diplomacy in the region.

Third, Hu did not sign a long-predicted nuclear
cooperation deal with Pakistan, an omission that was
evidently aimed at calming New Delhi, which has long
been wary of such cooperation. China and Pakistan
will, however, continue to cooperate in nuclear power
production as per past agreements, which also permit
the construction of the second nuclear power plant at
Chashma in western Pakistan. Yet Pakistan will not
receive the 6 additional power plants that it hoped
for from China any time soon. [6] China’s self-imposed
moratorium on further expansion of nuclear cooperation
with Pakistan also went down well in Washington,
calming its proliferation concerns.

The political Economy of Sino-Indian Relations

In particular, Hu celebrated the growing economic ties
between China and India, whose two-way trade of $24bn
in 2007 has already reached the current volume of
Indo-U.S. trade. [7] It is now projected to grow to
$40bn by 2010. [8] This dramatic growth in economic
cooperation is helping ease the border tensions
between Beijing and New Delhi as well. As of 2005, the
bulk of Sino-Indian trade was conducted through
maritime shipping, since overland trade was suspended
in 1962 after the outbreak of hostilities between the
two. The two nations have now agreed to reopen the
Himalayan crossing after 44 years of closing, to begin
overland trade. [9] This will further boost their
bilateral trade.

As well, ever-expanding economic ties are likely to
ease the lingering Sino-Indian border disputes. There
are already visible signs that Indians are willing to
exchange their claimed territory of Aksai Chin, which
remains under Chinese occupation, for Beijing’s
recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian Territory.
For its part, China is ready to concede almost all of
Arunachal Pradesh to India -- except for the Tawang
area [10] near the border with Tibet. The Chinese
believe that the Sino-Indian border dispute is a
legacy of “the western colonial powers,” [11] which
was “imposed on the Chinese and Indian peoples when
they were not masters in their own homes.” [12] China,
however, cannot let go of Aksai Chin that is the only
land link between its two turbulent western regions of
Tibet and Xinjiang.

Having grasped the importance of Aksai Chin to China,
India’s founding leader and the architect of
Sino-Indian alliance in the 1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru,
was inclined to “perpetually lease” it to China. [13]
Since the ceasefire that followed the Sino-Indian
border war of 1962, Beijing has repeatedly offered New
Delhi a similar solution to the dispute. In addition,
Indians are emboldened by the erstwhile Chinese
recognition of Indian sovereignty over Sikkim, to
which Beijing has long laid territorial claims. In his
April 2005 visit to India, Chinese Premier Wen
provided the Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh
with cartographic evidence showing Sikkim as part of
India. [14]

Emerging Triangulation of Regional Entente

With growing economic ties and subsiding political
disagreements, China is also moving fast to draw India
into a regional web of security relations with the
lead support of Russia, which is at the forefront of
such efforts to forge a triangular alliance among the
three nations. Russian President Vladimir Putin takes
credit for instituting trilateral dialogue among
China, India and Russia, [15] which is shaping a new
geopolitical reality in the region. As part of the
trilateral dialogue, the three nations’ foreign
ministers held their first meeting in May 2005 in
Russia. On February 14, 2007, they met in New Delhi
for their first formal trilateral dialogue. Earlier,
in July 2006, the three-way summit of the leaders of
China, India, and Russia was held in St. Petersburg,
where China and India were invited as observers to an
annual G-8 meeting that Russia hosted.

During his recent visit to India on Jan. 25-26 this
year as the guest of honor on India’s Republic Day,
Putin discussed what he described as trilateral
cooperation with Indian Prime Minister Singh. It is
worth noting that Prime Minister Singh went beyond the
call of protocol to receive President Putin at
airport. [16] Later, Putin standing shoulder to
shoulder with Singh told a news conference in New
Delhi, “We want to resolve regional problems in a way
acceptable to all sides. We therefore think that there
are good prospects for working together in a
trilateral format.” [17] Indians who have long been
beholden to Russia seem to embrace Putin’s trilateral
initiative, while remaining skeptical about the
Indo-U.S. alliance. “Russia has seen India as a key to
Asian stability for the past 50 years, some four
decades before George W Bush’s team reached that
conclusion,” [18] K. Subrahmanyam, India’s foremost
observer of strategic affairs, noted with a tinge of
sarcasm. In a realist mode, he advised the Indian
government: “In a balance of power world, India has to
learn to deal simultaneously with all major powers to
enhance its own national interest.” [19]

The emerging triangulation has, however, internal
dynamics as well. Internally, all three nations have
been facing the triple menace of what Chinese describe
as “extremism, separatism, and terrorism” (EST).
China’s sore points are the Buddhist autonomous region
of Tibet and the Muslim-majority autonomous region of
Xinjiang; India has its trouble spots in Jammu and
Kashmir and the Maoists-dominated Northeast (the
latter is a cluster of several states); and Russia has
its nemesis in Chechen separatists in the north.
Although all three nations acknowledge, in varying
degrees, the presence of domestic discontent behind
their separatist challenges, they openly blame
external powers for the flare-up. These internal and
external dynamics are conflating into a tripartite
regional entente.

To promote military cooperation in the battle against
EST, India and China, China and Russia, and Russia and
India have already conducted joint military exercises.
These exercises, however, have been overshadowed by
the “Malabar 07-2” in the Bay of Bengal in which
Australia, India, Japan, Singapore and the U.S.
participated with 20,000 military personnel and 25
ships. The stated aim of the joint naval exercises is
to counter terrorism and piracy, which are threatening
the Strait of Malacca, an 805-km-long strip of sea
between Malaysia and Sumatra, through which 60% of the
world’s energy is shipped. Yet anticipating China’s
reaction to “Malabar 07-2,” India publicly rejected
suggestions that China is “the focus of the war
games,” and that India intends to “set up a new
security alliance.” [20] India’s assurance was backed
up by its planned first-ever joint army exercises with
China itself, which are slated for October this year.
The Sino-Indian drills are also aimed at
counterterrorism. They were planned after a landmark
visit to China by the Indian army chief Gen. J.J.
Singh to China in May this year. Later, Indian Prime
Minister Man Mohan Singh met with Chinese President Hu
Jintao in Germany, where the two traveled to attend
the G-8 meeting this year and further assured him:
“Our government and people, regardless of their
political affiliations, want the strongest
relationship with China.” [21] India plans joint
military exercises with Moscow as well.

To institutionalize long-term cooperation between
China, India and Russia, India was brought into the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which, among
other things, seeks to neutralize the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) advance into the region.
[22] China and Russia seem to be ready to accept India
as a voting member of the SCO, which will be an
upgrade on India’s current status as an observer. The
SCO will eventually culminate in formal trilateral
alliance that would bind China, India, and Russia into
a regional and global entente. [23] This triangulation
seeks to guarantee India’s due place in the South
Asian region and to prevent it from engaging in
security alliances with external powers. Yet China and
India both agreed to “play their respective roles in
the region and beyond, while remaining sensitive to
each other’s concerns and aspirations.” [24]

To further boost their security relationship, China
also signed a civilian nuclear cooperation deal with
India in November last year. It is pertinent to note
that Beijing’s reluctance to offer Islamabad such a
deal was partly attributed to the latter’s close
alliance with NATO nations, whose tens of thousands of
troops are fighting Taliban insurgents in China’s
neighborhood in Afghanistan. [25] The state-run Press
Trust of India (PTI) news agency gushingly billed the
Sino-Indian nuclear agreement as “a major advance,” in
which “China and India agreed to promote cooperation
in nuclear energy consistent with their international
commitments.” [26] To caution potential proliferators
and to display their credentials as responsible
nuclear power states, both further reiterated that
“international civilian (nuclear) cooperation” should
be conducted in keeping with “the global
non-proliferation principles.” [27]

Although Sino-Indian nuclear cooperation is not of the
same magnitude as the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal that will
yield a $100-billion-deal for the U.S. nuclear
industry, it will help India through the hurdles at
the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for such
key supplies as nuclear fuel. China and Russia sit on
the NSG as members. The Chinese offer of nuclear
cooperation with India was taken in step with Chinese
acceptance, however reluctant, of the landmark
Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The Indian External Affairs
Minister Pranab Mukherjee took upon himself to break
the news that “China has endorsed the Indo-U.S.
nuclear deal.” [28] In reciprocity, Mukherjee said,
“India would not object if China signed a similar
nuclear deal with Pakistan.” [28] In the same vein,
Russia has offered to sell India 4 light water nuclear
reactors and an arsenal worth $10bn. [29] Indians
affectionately spell out PUTIN as “planes, uranium,
tanks, infrastructure, and nuclear power.” [30]

Indian Response to Chinese Overtures

Indians are receptive to Chinese overtures, especially
Hu’s deft diplomacy at reaching across the schism
between India and China’s protagonist Pakistan.
Indians, however, remain deeply divided over the China
question. Its current government led by the Indian
National Congress and motley regional parties seems
open to reaching a broad accommodation with Beijing
while pursuing cooperation with the U.S. The
Congress’s predecessor, the Bhartiya Janta Party
(BJP), which subscribes to an ultranationalist
ideology of Hindutva, however, took a harder line on
the future shape of Sino-Indian relations. Soon after
India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the BJP
Minister for Defense identified China as “India’s
Number One problem.” Shortly after his intemperate
statement, however, the pragmatic BJP showed the
Minister to the door.

Sumit Ganguly condenses the diversity of Indian public
opinion on “the rise of China” and Sino-Indian
relations into three groups, “
there are those who
appease and muddle through, those who advocate
strategic engagement, and those who take a
confrontational approach.” [31] He puts the Indian
National Congress and the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) in the first category, the Hindu
nationalist BJP in the second, and an amorphous
minority, whom he describes as “the lunatic fringe,”
in the third. [32] Ganguly, however, overstates the
Indian National Congress’s “appeasement” of China. The
Congress, which has vigorously pursued Indian
interests in befriending China in the 1950s and yet
fighting it in the sixties, can hardly be described as
“China’s appeaser.”

Historically, the Congress was born of Indian
nationalism, and as such it has pursued independent
foreign policy without allying itself with any of the
power blocs. It is for this reason that Congress and
its allies in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
coalition government diverge from the U.S. in their
vision of global security. It was due to this
divergent vision that India politely declined to be
involved in policing Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly,
President Bush’s vision of the “axis of evil” was not
automatically transferred on to India, which continues
to have an estimated $40 billion worth of oil and gas
interests in Iran and with which it is in talks for
the construction of an additional $10bn gas pipeline,
despite U.S. objections. India’s huge investments in
Iran, combined with its desire to be assertively
independent in its diplomacy, were the reason that
India, which sits at the 35-member board of governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was
reluctant to report Iran to the UN Security Council
for the latter’s nuclear program. The U.S. had to
lobby it so hard that the very landmark Indo-U.S.
nuclear deal was threatened to be shelved
indefinitely. India finally voted with the U.S., but
only after China and Russia led the path.

India also has a vibrant peace movement and the
growing Indian Left which is pressing for deeper
Sino-Indian relations. Praful Bidwai, long an advocate
of Sino-Indian amity, is the latter-day Gandhi of the
Indian peace movement. Many realists such as Kuldip
Nayar, one of the elder statesmen of the Indian
National Congress, often oppose the Indian Left on
Sino-Indian relations. Nayar, however, has recently
advised the Indian government against totally allying
with the U.S. “It suits us (India) to keep America
guessing whether we would ever be a counter force to
check China,” he wrote in a syndicated op-ed piece.
[33] At the same time, he argued that the Indo-U.S.
alliance has instrumental value for India to squeeze a
better deal from China on the Sino-Indian border
dispute: “Not that America’s friendship is crucial to
us, but our equation with it will help us get a better
offer on the border (dispute) from China.” [34]


The Indo-US alliance is unlikely to break India apart
from China, let alone set the two on a collision
course. If anything, it seems to have nudged Beijing
and New Delhi ever closer. India’s growing economic
ties with China, marked by a trade surplus of tens of
billions of dollars, will further deepen their
diplomatic relations. Unlike Sino-Japanese history of
colonialism, China and India are unencumbered of such
a baggage. That is why they do not share a past of
antagonisms to poison their present. Even the 1962 war
and the Chinese security relationship with Pakistan,
which long embittered Sino-Indian relations, are a far
cry from the legacy of colonial relations that
continue to mark Sino-Japanese relations and stir
visceral emotions in both nations. Yet in significant
ways, China’s economic diplomacy appears to overtaken
political disagreements with Japan, of which it is now
the world’s largest trading partner. The underlying
assumption of Chinese emergent diplomacy is that
economics trumps politics as China’s experiences with
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Japan,
Taiwan, and the U.S. amply demonstrate. China has
modeled its relations with India on the same economic
logic of its regional and global diplomacy. To address
its political disagreements with India, China is going
a step further by calling for a swap of “land for
peace with India.” While the issues are not yet fully
resolved, this is evident in its conceding of Sikkim
and almost all of Arunachal Pradesh to India.

Above all, China is creating entente in South Asia to
recognize India’s dominant position in the region. Its
changed stance on Kashmir, scaled-down nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan, and shelving of Islamabad’s
request for an upgrade on its observer status on the
SCO are substantial steps towards Chinese recognition
of India’s looming presence in South Asia. Russia,
which has become the nucleus of the emerging
triangulation of strategic cooperation -- between
China, India and Russia -- is further helping along
Sino-Indian relations. Russia’s central role in the
trilateral dialogue has already helped calm strategic
competition between China and India.

This calm is evident from China’s measured reaction to
India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 and its subsequent
landmark nuclear deal with the U.S. China and India,
in fact, are so sure of their future relations that
they have struck a nuclear deal of their own.
Furthermore, China has pledged to drop its opposition
to India’s bid for the UNSC. For its part, India has
pledged to further deepen its relations with China and
make “irreversible” the positive progress it has
already achieved in forging such relations. [35] To
calm mutual suspicions, Hu expressed his country’s
appreciation of Indian Prime Minister Singh’s
statement in 2005 “that India would not be part of any
containment strategy against China.” [36] This
statement, however, has to be tested against the
emerging shape of Indo-U.S. relations and their impact
on the triangular relationship between China, India
and Russia.

Russia seems to keep pushing Sino-Indian relations in
the direction of mutual amity. It commands India’s
utmost confidence that is rooted in the Indo-Russian
longest and friendliest history of military and
nuclear cooperation. Their past relations have further
enriched with Moscow’s growing economic fortune from
its energy resources. As a result, contemporary
Russia, after a long time, is expanding its economic
reach into India. In turn, India is eying Russia’s
foreign exchange reserves of $1trillion, one of the
world’s largest funds, for developing its decayed
infrastructure. In the like vein, India needs to be
shouldered by China and Japan for its due place on the
proposed East Asian Community (EAC) to further boost
its economy.

Indo-Japanese relations are already robust. Japan
anticipates that its relations with India will surpass
“Japan-US and Japan-China relations” in 10 years. [37]
Despite this inter-state bonhomie, Indo-Japanese
relations came under greater strain due to the
Indo-U.S. nuclear pact. Japan, which is an ardent
advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
is hard pressed to swallow the transfer of nuclear
technology to a country that is neither a signatory to
the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty), nor is willing to
bring all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA’s
(International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections.
China, on the other hand, appears to have given India
a free pass on all such concerns by endorsing the
Indo-U.S. nuclear pact and striking a nuclear deal of
its own.

Yet India seeks deeper relations with the U.S. to help
modernize its economy, strengthen its military, and
make needed advances in science and technology. The
Indo-U.S. nuclear deal addresses all these concerns.
Above all, India needs the U.S. to step onto the world
stage as an emerging world power. To achieve this end,
India will heed Subrahmanyam’s advice “to learn to
deal simultaneously with all major powers to enhance
its own national interest.” [38] India will do so even
if it has to play off competitive tensions between
China and the U.S. to its advantage as described by an
Indian statesman, Kuldip Nayar: “It suits (India) to
keep America guessing whether we would ever be a
counter force to check China
. Not that America’s
friendship is crucial to us, but our equation with it
will help us get a better offer on the border
(dispute) from China.” [39] Chinese and Indians have
come to recognize this reality by agreeing that they
both will “play their respective roles in the region
and beyond, while remaining sensitive to each other’s
concerns and aspirations.” [40]

Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the
University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire:
(niazit at uwec.edu). He thanks Mark Selden for his
extensive comments and extremely helpful suggestions
on the early drafts of this paper. Tarique Niazi wrote
this article for Japan Focus. Posted on October


1. Tim Beal (2006). “Using India to Keep China at
Bay.” Foreign Policy in Focus, December 12, 2006.
2. John Cherian (2006). “Towards lasting ties:
Visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao proposes
extensive cooperation between India and China to
create a win-win situation.” The Hindu, India,
December 15, 2006.
3. “China’s global strategy with a difference.” Daily
Times, Lahore, November 26, 2006. 6. Also see Mustafa,
Abid (2006). “Have Sino-Pak ties reached the end?” The
Nation, Pakistan, December 5, 2006.
4. “No scenario to affect ties: Hu.” The Post,
Islamabad, November 26, 2006.
5. John Cherian op.cit.
6. Tarique Niazi (2006). “Thunder in Sino-Pakistani
Relations.” China Brief, vol. VI (5), March 1, 2006,
pp. 1-4.
7. For a detailed review of Sino-Indian trade ties,
see Niazi, Tarique (2006). “Asia Between China and
India.” Japan Focus, May 31, 2006.
8. Karishma Vaswani (2006). “Chinese firms find all is
not rosy in India.” BBC News, November 20, 2006.
9. ibid
10. John Cherian, op.cit.
11. “China says will solve India border issue.” The
Dawn, Karachi (Pakistan), March 6, 2007.
12. ibid
13. Kuldip Nayar (2006). “The Indo-China border
question.” The Nation (Lahore, Pakistan), December 5,
14. Tarique Niazi (2006). “Asia Between China and
India.” Japan Focus, May 31, 2006.
15. Vladimir Radyuhin (2007). “Putin Visit: Chance of
Course Correction.” The Hindu, January 23, 2007.
16. ibid.
17. Rachel Douglas (2007). “Nuclear Power Tops Putin’s
Agenda in India.” Executive Intelligence Review (EIR),
February 9, 2007
18. K. Subrahmanyam (2007). “The Lessons from Putin’s
visit.” Rediff.com, January 29, 2007.
19. Ibid
20. Praful Bidwai (2007). “US exercising India’s
military muscles.” Asia Times.
21. “India and China to conduct joint army exercises.”
China Daily, June 7, 2007.
22. Tariq Fatemi (2006). “In the wake of Hu’s visit.”
The Dawn, Karachi, December 2, 2006.
23. Inayatullah (2006). “Hu Jintao visits to South
Asia.” The Nation, Lahore (Pakistan), December 2,
24. “A Milestone.” The Press Trust of India (PTI),
November 22, 2006.
25. Khalid Hasan (2006). “China to sign US-like N-deal
with India.” Daily Times, Lahore, November 21, 2006.
26. “A Milestone.” The Press Trust of India (PTI),
November 22, 2006.
27. ibid.
28. Cherian, op.cit.
29. Rachel Douglas (2007). “Nuclear Power Tops Putin’s
Agenda in India.” Executive Intelligence Review (EIR),
February 9, 2007.
30. Damian Grammaticas (2007). “Russia and India’s
complex friendship.” BBC News Article, January 26,
31. Sumit Ganguly (2002). “Assessing India’s Response
To The Rise of China: Fears and Misgivings.” In
Carolyn W. Pumphrey (ed.) The Rise of China in Asia:
Security Implications, pp. 95-104. Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute.
32. ibid, p.101
33. Kuldip Nayar, op.cit.
34. ibid.
35. Cherian, op.cit.
36. ibid.
37. For an excellent review of Indo-Japanese
disagreements over the India’s nuclear pact with the
U.S., see Massako Toki (2007). “Will Japan Support
India’s Nukes?” Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF):
38. K. Subrahmanyam, op.cit.
39. Kuldip Nayar, op.cit.
40. “A Milestone.” The Press Trust of India (PTI),
November 22, 2006.

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