[Marxism] From wikileaks: Pentagon Papers II
lnp3 at panix.com
Mon Mar 2 11:58:03 MST 2009
WIKILEAKS NOTABLE DOCUMENT RELEASE
Mon Mar 2 17:13:31 GMT 2009
"Pentagon Papers II?"
This major November, 2008 RAND Corporation study on intelligence
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducted 300 interviews at all
levels with US, UK and Dutch intelligence officers and diplomats.
The 318 page document could be described as part of the "Pentagon
Papers" for Iraq and Afghanistan. It was confidentially prepared for the
Pentagon's Joint Forces Command and focuses on intelligence and
The study's distribution was restricted to a select group of Coalition
war partners and Israel.
It is a notable news and policy source, not for its arguments or
conclusions, but rather for its wealth of candid and revealing interview
quotes which are spread throughout the document, but especially in the
200 page appendix.
The material has been verified, and we ask readers to go through the
document to extract key quotes for their communities. There are quotes
on almost every aspect of the wars. The authors of the quotes, ranging
from the UK Ambassador and the former head of the Defense Intelligence
Agency to on the ground intelligence officers, can be discovered via the
Sample interview quotes:
The intelligence on the military side was not tied in with the CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency], and the CIA was not listened to. . . . I
had my most depressing discussions with the intelligence people who
could see what this was leading to, and could see what the pop- ulation
thought better than [then-director of reconstruction and humanitarian
assistance in Iraq L. Paul] Bremer could. . . . Between Bremer and [then
secretary of state Donald H.] Rumsfeld, it had to be all talked up,
which is the American way. . . . The discussion with Bremer was always
on the optimistic side, while on the intelligence side it was much less
so. And I think the same was true to an extent of [GEN John Philip
Abizaid]. You don't succeed within the U.S. system unless you [display a
In the military, . . . complex, divergent thinkers, either . . .
bite their tongue or they get out.. . . Very, very rarely they get to be
[A combined joint special-operations Task Force] snatched two
brothers who were sons of a sheikh [with whom we have very good
relations.] They did coordinate it, but did so poorly. They said, Were
coming by to pick up this guy named whatever and used a name that was so
common the task force couldnt know who it was. . . . Hes still in jail,
and Im trying to deal with their father, and I havent been able to find
[the son]. . . . These guys go in and blow down doors . . . when all
they need to do is knock and theyll let them in. . . . They killed the
son in a Christian family. . . . They said [that the son] was reaching
for a gun. Yeah, okay, he shouldnt have done that, but these guys blew
down the door, blew through the wall, and came with all their toys.
(Afghanistan) infrastructure manning those responsible for planning
infrastructure recoverywas only 650 strong out of 16,000 people at [U.S.
Dutch F-16s would go out and fly missions [in Afghanistan], and
after the missions they would ask for the BDA [battle-damage
assessments], which were classified Secret U.S. They could fly the
mission and drop the ordnance, but they couldnt get the battle-damage
The military would look and say, Its stable, so lets go someplace
else. Well, maybe its stable because of the footprint we have there. . .
. There is a rush to determine a snapshot of the security situation in
order to reduce the footprint. . . . Were seeing an increase in violence
in [this city] because they continue to decrease the number of soldiers
there. . . . [When we started pulling out] the Iraqis themselves said,
We are not ready yet.
We also spent a lot of time, money, blood, and treasure on going
after MVTs [medium- value targets] and HVTs . . . and I dont think it
had a great deal of effect on the Taliban because they are not
hierarchical. If we killed one guy, they just replaced him in about
10minutes. . . . [In that regard,] they are not that different [from] us.
I think that not interfering would be interfering with our mission.
We dealt with training the police and then sent them out to the
community. If they werent paid, then they were extorting money at
roadblocks. As the police are seen as coming out of our gates, eventu-
ally the extortion is going to reflect on us. The average Afghan citizen
is not able to discern that it is Kabul that is at fault. . . . The
Taliban is capitalizing on this very fact, because it is a regression to
the situation like it was back before 1994. Police extortion is one way
the Taliban is winning over the population.
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