[Marxism] An Eroding Syrian Army Points to Strain

Louis Proyect lnp3 at panix.com
Wed Apr 29 07:10:24 MDT 2015


NY Times, Apr. 29 2015
An Eroding Syrian Army Points to Strain
By ANNE BARNARD, HWAIDA SAAD and ERIC SCHMITT

BEIRUT, Lebanon — The Syrian Army has suffered a string of defeats from 
re-energized insurgents and is struggling to replenish its ranks as even 
pro-government families increasingly refuse to send sons to poorly 
defended units on the front lines. These developments raise newly urgent 
questions about the durability of President Bashar al-Assad’s rule.

“The trend lines for Assad are bad and getting worse,” said a senior 
United States official in Washington, who, speaking on condition of 
anonymity to discuss confidential intelligence assessments, nevertheless 
cautioned that things had not yet reached “a boiling point.”

The erosion of the army is forcing the government to rely ever more 
heavily on Syrian and foreign militias, especially Hezbollah, the 
Lebanese Shiite group allied with Iran. Hezbollah now leads or even 
directs the fight in many places, angering some Syrian officers, said 
several Syrian soldiers, as well as the senior United States official 
and a Syrian with close ties to the security establishment. Most Syrians 
interviewed asked that their names be fully or partially withheld to 
avoid reprisals.

This month, government forces have crumbled or fled in areas long cited 
by officials as markers of enduring state control. Insurgents seized 
Idlib, a northern provincial capital, and the lone working border 
crossing with Jordan in the south. Counteroffensives failed, and 
advances this week have brought a newly cohesive insurgent coalition 
closer than ever to Mr. Assad’s coastal strongholds. The coalition 
consists mainly of Islamist groups that include Qaeda’s Syrian 
affiliate, the Nusra Front, but oppose the Islamic State.

Throughout the country, there are signs of strain that contrast with Mr. 
Assad’s public confidence. The government recently dismissed the heads 
of two of its four main intelligence agencies after they quarreled; one 
later died, reportedly after being beaten by the other’s guards.

Officials in provincial capitals like Aleppo and Dara’a are making 
contingency plans to preserve cash and antiquities and evacuate 
civilians. Foreign exchange reserves, $30 billion at the start of the 
war, have dwindled to $1 billion.

The already-crowded coastal provinces are straining with new arrivals 
from Idlib, with some saying officials have turned them away. In central 
Damascus, checkpoints are fewer and more sparsely staffed, as militiamen 
are sent to fight on the outskirts, and young men increasingly evade 
army service.

Even in areas populated by minority sects that fear hard-line Islamist 
groups like Nusra and the Islamic State — such as Druse in the south, 
Assyrian Christians in the north, and Ismailis in Hama — numerous 
residents say they are sending their sons abroad to avoid the draft, or 
keeping them home to protect villages.

That has accelerated the transformation of Syria’s once-centralized 
armed forces into something beginning to resemble that of the 
insurgents: a patchwork of local and foreign fighters whose interests 
and priorities do not always align.

Four years ago, Syria’s army had 250,000 soldiers; now, because of 
casualties and desertions, it has 125,000 regulars, alongside 125,000 
pro-government militia members, including Iranian-trained Iraqis, 
Pakistanis and Afghan Hazaras, according to the senior American official 
in Washington.

And Syrians are not always in charge, especially where Hezbollah, the 
best trained and equipped of the foreign militias, is involved.

“Every area where there is Hezbollah, the command is in their hands,” 
said the Syrian with security connections. “You do something, you have 
to ask their permission.”

That, he said, rankled senior security officials who recalled the rule 
of Mr. Assad’s father, Hafez, in the 1980s, when Hezbollah’s patron Iran 
was the junior partner in the alliance with Syria.

American officials are exploring how to exploit resulting tensions 
between Syrian and Hezbollah commanders, said the senior American official.

An official in the region sympathetic to Hezbollah said that enemies 
were trying to exploit natural tensions that “happen between allies, and 
between brothers and sisters in the same house,” but would not succeed.

“Even if Hezbollah does battle alone, it is with Syrian approval,” said 
the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss 
internal deliberations. “Hezbollah is only a stone that helps the builder.”

But others see a loss of Syrian sovereignty to Iran, which needs Syria 
as a conduit to arm Hezbollah. Charles Lister, a Syria expert at the 
Brookings Doha Center in Doha, Qatar, said Iran with the help of 
Hezbollah and other militias is building “a state within a state in 
Syria — an insurance policy to protect itself against any future Assad 
demise.”

Ali, 23, a soldier on leave in Damascus from the southern front, said 
one of his officers, a major, had complained that any Hezbollah fighter 
was “more important than a Syrian general.”

Then there is simple jealousy. Hezbollah fighters are paid in dollars, 
while Syrian soldiers get depreciating Syrian pounds. Hezbollah fighters 
get new black cars and meat with rice, Ali said, while Syrian soldiers 
make do with dented Russian trucks and stale bread.

A student who recently fled Damascus after being constantly stopped at 
checkpoints to prove he is not a deserter said that Hezbollah now runs 
his neighborhood in the old city and once helped him solve a problem 
between his brother and security forces. (Syrian police, he said, are so 
little seen that people now smoke hashish openly.)

“If you have Hezbollah wasta,” or connections, he said, “your problems 
will be solved.” The student identified himself only as Hamed Al Adem, a 
name he uses as a performance artist, to protect family members still in 
Damascus.

Even so, Hezbollah is not in a position to bail out Mr. Assad the way it 
did in 2013, when it sent hundreds of fighters to crush the insurgent 
hub of Qusayr, near the Lebanese border.

Hezbollah now has more fighters and advisers in Syria than ever, about 
5,000, American intelligence officials said. But, said the Syrian with 
security connections, they “only interfere in areas that are in their 
own interests.”

The official sympathetic to Hezbollah said it has “maybe thousands” of 
fighters along the Lebanese border, hundreds in the south, bordering 
Israel, and only dozens around divided Aleppo, Syria’s largest city.

It had none in Idlib city, which he said may have fallen because some 
Syrian officers failed to correctly assess threats.

The Syrian with security ties said the leadership had not made a 
priority of defending Idlib. Many government troops, he said, fled after 
insurgents knocked out their communications network and called “God is 
Great” from the mosques.

“Damascus and the Syrian coast, other than this nothing is important. 
Nothing,” he said, adding of Mr. Assad: “He doesn’t give a damn if Syria 
is destroyed.”

One long-serving soldier said his cousin called from a hastily dug 
foxhole near Idlib to send shaky goodbyes to his mother. The soldier, 
who serves on another front and has lost an uncle and a cousin in 
battle, was enraged to hear that the 10 men pinned down there lacked 
even a vehicle to flee.

“If I have a kid, I won’t send him to the army,” he declared, 
complaining that his monthly pay covers just 10 days’ worth of expenses. 
“Why be killed or slaughtered?”

In Sweida, the mostly pro-government, mostly Druse southern province, 
“In every single house there is one man at least wanted for the army 
service,” said Abu Tayem, a Druse activist there.

Last week, he said, after a friend of his was arrested for evading the 
army, residents attacked security officers, captured one and traded him 
for the prisoner. Recently, the government tried to recruit Druse forces 
to be trained by Hezbollah, but few signed up after hearing they would 
be asked to fight Sunnis in neighboring Dara’a.

To enlist at this point would be foolish, not to speak of dangerous, 
said Majed, 19, a Druse whose father helped him evade the draft. “When 
the regime is gone, then our neighbors will be our enemies,” he said.

Fayez Korko, 48, said he helped organize an Assyrian militia in 
northeastern Syria after villagers concluded that the government’s 
promises of protection were “empty words.” He called the government “the 
best of the worst” — better than extremist Islamists — but said that 
Assyrians would rather die defending their villages than on faraway fronts.

Events like the fall of Idlib, said the Syrian with security ties, are 
frustrating even a core government constituency — minority Alawites, who 
belong to Mr. Assad’s sect and disproportionately serve in the military. 
They are beginning to doubt that the president can protect them, as they 
gambled in sticking with him for an existential fight, said the Syrian, 
who is Alawite.

“Syria is not you,” he said, addressing Mr. Assad, “and you are not Syria.”

Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad reported from Beirut, and Eric Schmitt from 
Washington. Reporting was contributed by Maher Samaan and Ben Hubbard 
from Beirut; Somini Sengupta from Amman, Jordan; and an employee of The 
New York Times from Damascus, Syria.




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