[Marxism] Syrian Coalition: Assad Squandered Syria’s Sovereignty to Israeli, Russian and Iranian Aggressors

Mark Richey markrichey at earthlink.net
Mon Oct 19 07:32:05 MDT 2015

You could say much the same thing about many regimes in the region, or elsewhere, such as Egypt, or Pakistan.  How does that justify massive foreign armed intervention, together with violence particularly directed against ethnic and religious minorities?  That is your implication.  Have Libyans seen a more humane economic system put in place?  

 Also, there is very little evidence that the jihadists are critics of the Syrian economic model.  When interviewed, such as in the recent interview of the chief of al-Nusra, they only call for murder of Assad and Hassan Nasrallah, of Lebanon, and also of the Alawite population ('hundreds of missiles on Alawite cities.') in general.  Pure sectarian/ethnic/religious hatred. 

 I have never seen any indication that the jihadists and former Assad military chiefs have any agenda other than putting in place a dictatorship with THEM in charge--and a dictatorship involving genocide against the Syrian minorities, who have nearly all fled when their territory is conquered by jihadists.

-----Original Message-----
>From: Louis Proyect <lnp3 at panix.com>
>Sent: Oct 19, 2015 9:17 PM
>To: Mark Richey <markrichey at earthlink.net>, Activists and scholars in Marxist tradition <marxism at lists.csbs.utah.edu>
>Subject: Re: [Marxism] Syrian Coalition: Assad Squandered Syria’s Sovereignty to Israeli, Russian and Iranian Aggressors
>On 10/19/15 12:30 AM, Mark Richey via Marxism wrote:
>> Allowing transit  is a far different thing than BRINGING the
>> jihadists to Syria, and Assad's alowing transit was secndary to the
>> US sponsorship of jihadist networks deriving from the US campaign in
>> Afghanistan.  Together with Saudi sponsorship.  Assad just played
>> along.
>The point of the article is to show that Assad's opposition to jihadis 
>is bullshit. When his cops facilitated their entry into Syria when it 
>served his ends, that should have put the kibosh on the idea that he is 
>fighting al-Qaeda, etc. The only thing he is fighting are poor Sunnis 
>who flocked to the city when rural misery forced an internal migration 
>not much different than the one that makes Mexicans come to the USA. If 
>you had the slightest familiarity with Syrian society. Like all members 
>of the Baathist amen corner, you could care less about such matters.
>After Bashar al-Asad succeeded his father in 2000, the architects of 
>Syria’s economic policy sought to reverse the downturn by liberalizing 
>the economy further, for instance by reducing state subsidies. Private 
>banks were permitted for the first time in nearly 40 years and a stock 
>market was on the drawing board. After 2005, the state-business bonds 
>were strengthened by the announcement of the Social Market Economy, a 
>mixture of state and market approaches that ultimately privileged the 
>market, but a market without robust institutions or accountability. 
>Again, the regime had consolidated its alliance with big business at the 
>expense of smaller businesses as well as the Syrian majority who 
>depended on the state for services, subsidies and welfare. It had 
>perpetuated cronyism, but dressed it in new garb. Families associated 
>with the regime in one way or another came to dominate the private 
>sector, in addition to exercising considerable control over public 
>economic assets. These clans include the Asads and Makhloufs, but also 
>the Shalish, al-Hassan, Najib, Hamsho, Hambouba, Shawkat and al-As‘ad 
>families, to name a few. The reconstituted business community, which now 
>included regime officials, close supporters and a thick sliver of the 
>traditional bourgeoisie, effected a deeper (and, for the regime, more 
>dangerous) polarization of Syrian society along lines of income and region.
>Successive years of scant rainfall and drought after 2003 produced 
>massive rural in-migration to the cities -- more than 1 million people 
>had moved by 2009 -- widening the social and regional gaps still 
>further. Major cities, such as Damascus and Aleppo, absorbed that 
>migration more easily than smaller ones, which were increasingly starved 
>of infrastructural investment. Provincial cities like Dir‘a, Idlib, Homs 
>and Hama, along with their hinterlands, are now the main battlegrounds 
>of the rebellion. Those living in rural areas have seen their 
>livelihoods gutted by reduction of subsidies, disinvestment and the 
>effects of urbanization, as well as decades of corrupt authoritarian 
>rule. The Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings motivated them to express 
>their discontent openly and together.

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