[Marxism] The Editor of Jacobin on the Evolution of American Socialism

Louis Proyect lnp3 at panix.com
Fri Apr 26 09:56:18 MDT 2019

The New Yorker, April 26, 2019
Q. & A.
The Editor of Jacobin on the Evolution of American Socialism
By Isaac Chotiner

Bernie Sanders exceeds the rest of the Democratic field in his ability 
to change the conditions in which policy is written, the editor of 
Jacobin says.Source Photograph by Mark Wilson / Getty
In 2010, amid the wreckage of an economic crisis, Bhaskar Sunkara, then 
twenty-one years old, started the magazine Jacobin. Democratic socialist 
in outlook and aimed at replicating the success that magazines such as 
National Review had had in spurring on the conservative revolution, 
Jacobin grew into a sometimes doctrinaire but frequently engaging and 
thought-provoking journal. And when Bernie Sanders’s 2016 Presidential 
campaign surpassed almost everyone’s expectations, it became clear that 
the ideas that Jacobin had been pushing had wider support than was 
generally understood. Three years later, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez 
emerged as a Democratic star; Sanders became a 2020 front-runner, and 
portraits of young socialists appeared in a cover story in New York.

Now comes Sunkara’s first book, “The Socialist Manifesto: The Case for 
Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality,” which is both a 
history of socialism in the twentieth century and a blueprint for how 
democratic-socialist ideas might succeed in the twenty-first century. 
Taking in everything from Lenin’s rise to Sweden’s status as “the most 
livable society in history,” the book does not defend the failures of 
Marxist-inspired societies. Nevertheless, Sunkara scorns the idea that 
those failures should limit the ambitions of reformers and 
revolutionaries intent on creating a fairer society.

I recently spoke by phone with Sunkara, who, in addition to his work on 
Jacobin, is a columnist for the Guardian US. During our conversation, 
which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed the different 
approaches that Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have taken to progressive 
reform, why Americans vote against their economic interests, and whether 
liberals are too focussed on the explanatory power of race.

Q: How do you see the difference between democratic socialism and social 
democracy, and why do you think that difference is so crucial to the 
future of radical politics?

A: Great question. We obviously have a common ancestor, Karl Marx.

Q: Not you and me, just to be clear.

A: Right, not us. Karl Marx and [Friedrich] Engels both called 
themselves social democrats. It was a united movement in the big 
workers’ parties in the late nineteenth century. Then the movement kind 
of switched. Nowadays, what you would call social democracy is the 
movement that seeks to expand the welfare state, but within the confines 
of capitalism. It’s a kind of functional socialism. We’re going to cede 
ownership, but we’re going to tax those productive enterprises and make 
sure at least there’s a base level of security and rights for people.

A democratic socialist would say, “That’s great. Let’s fight for all 
those things, let’s have that kind of society.” Then we also want to ask 
deeper questions about ownership. One is, in a society where things are 
getting better for workers, but the ability to hold investment is still 
in the hand of capitalists, capitalists could always rebel against the 
social-democratic agreement. In Sweden, for example, capital by the late 
nineteen-seventies is basically saying, “All right, this agreement was 
working for us before, but now we’re not making enough profit. We need 
to roll back the welfare state.” If you can finally socialize investment 
and find a way to transfer production toward coöperatives and toward 
these other forms of socialized ownership, then maybe we can avoid that.

The second reason is just moral and ethical. I think that wage labor 
constitutes a form of hierarchy and exploitation that we could do without.

Q: Your book also evinces a certain respect for reformist, rather than 
radical, politics, and you write that you are aware of “how profound the 
gains of reform can be.” So why is Sweden insufficient? I think a lot of 
people would look at Sweden and say, “O.K., it’s not perfect. It can get 
better. But it’s about as good as any society that humans have been able 
to construct.”

A: Part of the reason why my tone is that way is I believe that a mass 
base of people pushing for things, like Medicare for All and all these 
other reforms we need in the United States, will be people who will be 
just like what you described, liberals and progressives. If we, as 
socialists, adopt this kind of too-snarky, radicaler-than-thou 
mentality, which obviously we can all slip into at times, we’ll alienate 
the potential base that could actually make a better country and a 
better world.

In Sweden, we have to look at what’s happened in the last twenty or 
thirty years. If you could freeze Sweden in 1974 or 1975, it’s a pretty 
damned good society. For the last twenty, thirty years, there’s been a 
rightward lurch in Swedish politics. There’s been ground opened for the 
populist, racist right. A lot of the welfare state has deteriorated.

I’m not sure that social democracy is sustainable in the long run. 
Eventually workers will start demanding things that will make inroads 
into the profitability of capitalist firms, and these capitalists will 
then turn on the social-democratic compromise. Is there a 
social-democratic road to socialism? I don’t see them as separate roads. 
I see one as kind of stopping short, stopping at the five-yard line or 
ten-yard line.

Q: It seems like you’re trying to make a practical argument, essentially 
saying that social democracy is always going to fall short and that 
there are structural reasons why it is likely to. Would that be fair to say?

A: Yes, exactly.

Q: There aren’t really any antecedents of what you are advocating for. 
And so, if we want to argue practically about what can work, does that 
make you anxious or wary?

A: Yeah, definitely. I think that’s one reason why I like to say, “Let’s 
go to social democracy. Let’s see what works.” But at some level I just 
believe that democracy is a good thing, and that we should have a 
certain set of ideals for our society, which is as much democracy as 
possible, as little hierarchy as possible. Now, there might be limits to 
that. Maybe a complex society with a complex division of labor does 
require some sort of hierarchy. I’m not sure how far we can go, but I do 
think it’s useful to have the social horizon.

Postwar Sweden was not a multiethnic, multicultural society in the way 
that modern America is. Are you worried that there’s an inherent 
contradiction between what we’re talking about and a society that is 
multicultural and multiethnic—that many people are unwilling to be a 
part of democratic socialism when people look different from them?

I’m not completely concerned. In Sweden’s case, they were organizing in 
a deeply unequal country. Now, are there certain organizing barriers in 
the U.S., a country with a really deep history of racism and racial 
inequity? Yes. But I think those barriers can be overcome by politics. I 
think human beings all want the same things. We all want to take care of 
ourselves, take care of our families. We know when we’re being 
oppressed. We know when we’re being exploited. We’ll always look for a 
way out of that situation if it were to arise.

Q: What makes you think that human beings all want the same thing?

A: We’re animals, right?

Q: I don’t mean sex and food.

A: We don’t like being oppressed. We don’t like being treated poorly. I 
think we want a degree of personal autonomy. I think these things are 
fairly innate. I’ll give you a concrete example. As women get more 
economically secure, as they’re in the workplace, they’re able to leave 
relationships, and divorce rates go up. Is that because these women were 
automatically indoctrinated with leftist ideals? I think it has more to 
do with the fact that they’re actually able to seek a better bargain for 
themselves as they’re given more power. When workers are in conditions 
of low unemployment, they tend to be more willing to go on strike and 
fight back. Also, if you look at the polling, people actually have a lot 
of the same concerns. They have the same concerns about health care, 
about security.

Q: Right, but do men feel more secure now that women have extra freedom? 
That seems like a more disturbing question or a more disturbing possible 
answer. The point is that I think some people perceive their security as 
coming at the expense of others.

A: Yeah, that’s one thing we need to battle against politically, because 
there is a zero-sum-game mentality when it comes to immigration, when it 
comes to gains by racial minorities, by women. We need to fight against 
that. The socialist case is that when it comes to, let’s say, white male 
workers, any privilege that they might have over nonwhite workers or 
over women is a relative privilege, not an absolute privilege. I don’t 
mean to downplay the difficulty and the need for anti-racism and 
feminist organizing, but it is to say that our premise, as socialists, 
is that we can construct a political coalition in which all oppressed 
people can make gains, even though some people are going to make less 
gains than others based on their relative position beforehand.

Q: You write in the book, “Socialists need to argue against the idea 
that racism and sexism are innate and that people’s consciousness won’t 
change through struggle. Racism has taken on an almost metaphysical role 
in liberal politics—it is somehow the cause of, explanation for, and 
consequence of most social phenomena. The reality is that people can 
overcome their prejudices in the process of mass struggle over shared 
interests, but that requires getting people involved in those common 
struggles to begin with.” When you say “metaphysical role,” are you 
talking about responses to Trump’s election?

A: I think after Trump’s election there was this idea that there is this 
original sin of racism in the United States, and we can’t get rid of it. 
Obviously, the United States is a society that was built on exclusion, 
that was built, in particular, on the exploitation of black Americans 
during slavery, and after slavery, too. It’s also a society in which 
there’s been a mass civil-rights movement and a feminist movement. There 
have been other things to make it more humane.

I don’t want to be Panglossian, but I want us to look back at the 
progress of the last half century and say, “There was great progress, 
but it wasn’t enough.” I think there was too much pessimism coming from 
liberal quarters about this. I think people could be won over. Do I 
think the ordinary Trump voter can be won over? I guess it depends. 
There’s obviously a core of Trump voters who are racist, who cannot be 
won over to a progressive program, and many of them aren’t even workers. 
They’re people who are the traditional base of the right in any country, 
this middle-class base of authoritarianism. There’s also a bunch of 
people who were just angry and discontented.

Q: Many people voted for Trump because he’s a Republican and they’re 
Republicans, and they’re often Republicans for reasons having to do with 
cultural issues like abortion. This gets back to what we were talking 
about earlier, about people wanting different things.

A: Yeah, I take your point that there is a caricature of speaking about 
economic issues that means essentially not speaking about other issues. 
But for me, for example, the struggle for reproductive rights is not a 
cultural or social issue; it is an economic issue. It’s an issue that I 
want to bring into working-class politics. In other words, who are the 
people who suffer the most if there’s no abortion clinic within fifty, 
sixty miles of them? It’s the poorest workers. Who are the people who 
suffer most from harassment on the job? The women workers. There is a 
way, I think, to foreground economic issues but not downplay other things.

Q: I agree that, by and large, Democrats do better when they talk about 
economic issues first. But there probably are a lot of poor people who 
feel like no abortion clinics mean fewer fetuses getting killed. I do 
think acknowledging that people have a totally different way of looking 
at things is important.

A: Yes, definitely. I think maybe one way to do this is to say, ‘Listen, 
we’re not going to backtrack or capitulate on anything we think is 
important, like fighting for immigrant rights or fighting for abortion 
rights, but we want to be so convincing on other issues that we can win 
people over.’ For example, if someone’s No. 3 issue is immigration, and 
they’re on the right on immigration, but their No. 1 issue is jobs and 
their No. 2 issue is health care, we want to convince them that we’re so 
good on No. 1 and No. 2 that they’ll vote for the Commie bastards anyway.

Q: It’s interesting that Trump thinks that his appeal is based on 
cultural and racial issues. His closing message in 2018 was not “Hey, 
struggling guy in Ohio, I improved your pocketbook.” It was “The Muslims 
are coming” or “The immigrants are coming.” His message in 2020 will 
likely be the same. I think it’s at least worth paying attention to the 
fact that he thinks that’s the way he can win those voters.

A: This is typical of this kind of right-wing populism. It’s pretty 
slippery. What he’s primarily pointing to is the idea that something was 
lost. Obviously, we need a counter to that. Part of it is speaking to a 
loss but in a different way. You want to talk to people about the fact 
that jobs have been lost. The unions have been devastated. We just want 
to point to different villains, which, of course, is a dangerous thing. 
But at least as far as Sanders or A.O.C. and this crop of left-wing 
politicians that emerged the last couple of years, I don’t see them as 
doing it in a way that fuels the right. I see them as doing it in a way 
that is helping to neutralize those on the right, keep it where it is, 
which is a minority authoritarian movement that’s going to cause a lot 
of headaches, that’s going to be around for a long time, but we’ve just 
got to keep them to their thirty-five or forty per cent, and we need to 
win over the rest.

Q: What have you made of the Jeremy Corbyn experience in Britain? Labour 
recently said that it wanted to end the principle of the free movement 
of people in any Brexit deal, and Corbyn hasn’t generally been strongly 
against Brexit. I wonder how you think he’s dealt with that, and if it’s 
given you any pause about how socialist or left-wing policymakers 
sometimes deal with these issues.

A: Even foregrounding the question of freedom of movement seems to be 
playing on the terrain of the right. Any voter that is going to vote on 
the issue of immigration and opposition to freedom of movement as a 
primary thing is not going to be won over. I think it’s 
counterproductive even at that political level.

Q: So to synthesize what you’re saying about Corbyn, and Sanders, too, 
who sometimes seems like he’s in favor of more restrictive immigration 
policies than some on the left—you want them to neutralize the right by 
talking about economic issues without engaging in any of the cultural 
demagoguery. Is that fair?

A: Yes, I want Sanders, instead of just saying, “Oh, I’m against open 
borders,” in this very negative way, to just say, “Immigrants are coming 
here because they want to construct America, and they’re working hard. 
I’d rather have them in the country than people like Donald Trump.” I 
just can’t imagine the Democratic electorate would be turned off by 
that. I can’t imagine it would be a poison pill. That’s the one thing 
that I see a lot of people on the left have been consistently prodding 
Sanders on, and he has showed a capacity to evolve on certain things. I 
do believe that if he were in power, you would see something like 
amnesty for people already here, and you would see a more humane 
immigration policy.

Q: Is Donald Trump a neoliberal?

A: This is a complicated question. Neoliberalism to me means the 
movement to use the power of the state in order to decrease the power of 
labor and to deregulate and restore the profitability of firms in the 
seventies and eighties. Since then it’s become the dominant economic 
consensus in the U.S. You still have a very strong aggressive state, but 
you don’t expand social welfare. You make sure things stay deregulated, 
and so on. In that sense, Trump is with the neoliberal consensus, but I 
think the term has been used as a pure pejorative to the point that it’s 
losing its analytical value.

Q: In terms of weakening Wall Street regulations or watering down 
regulations via Cabinet agencies, or not expanding the welfare state, I 
don’t think those really fit as a description of the Obama 
Administration, but maybe you do?

Q: I think the Obama Administration represented a centrist consensus 
within the Democratic Party, which said that the best way to preserve 
the welfare state was to insure that the economy was humming and growing 
and that, broadly, the interests of corporations were served because 
corporations were the ones generating the wealth that Obama wanted to 
use in order to sustain and expand social programs like Obamacare. But 
he, in the construction of the social programs, shied away from the 
creation of big universal programs that would have required more 
political struggle and actually might have been impossible to enact 
under his Administration. Would I call that neoliberal? I mean, maybe. I 
probably have many times in short columns and things like that, but I’m 
not sure how much analytical value it has.

If you watch what the Trump Administration is doing at the Environmental 
Protection Agency or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, talking 
about it as neoliberal seems to miss what’s going on to me because it 
seems noticeably different than what we—

I don’t think there’s a strong contingent of capital that’s calling for 
some of the things that Trump is doing. In other words, it seems to me 
that neoliberal policy would be deregulation that capital demanded, 
whereas Trump seems to be operating in his own ideological direction—it 
seems like with a degree of autonomy that I would have to reconcile with 
Marxist theory. [Laughs]

Q: It seems different than what we’ve seen in the past from either 
Republican or Democratic Administrations to some extent, no?

A: There’s definitely been a big departure in certain ways. I think 
there has been a continuity with Republican Administrations as far as 
tax cuts and so on. But things have definitely gotten worse, and worse 
faster than they did under Obama. Obviously, we opposed a lot of Obama’s 
policies, but there’s no point in saying it’s all the same, because it 
absolutely isn’t. If push comes to shove and I were in a swing state in 
2020, of course, I would vote for anyone in the Democratic field over 
Trump. I think that’s common sense. It should be hegemonic on the left.

Q: When Sanders was refusing to release his tax returns, you had a 
series of tweets in which you wrote, “People obsessed with tax returns 
are narrowly looking for personal corruption as a sign of capture. 
Politicians serve capitalist interests because they administer a 
capitalist state dependent on private profits and favorable market 
conditions to survive and fund programs.” And “Candidates aren’t 
literally bought by elites, they structurally represent capitalist 
interests. Bernie is an exception.” Can you explain this?

A: I was trying to make a broader point about the way in which the 
interests of businesses exert themselves in government, which is not 
through direct bribery or coercion or lobbying but more often than not 
through the dynamics of the economy itself. Things I said, like Bernie 
is an exception, undermine that point. So I wouldn’t stand by all of 
that. I would say I agree with my underlying point, but I do want to see 
Trump’s tax returns. I’m glad that Bernie released his tax returns, too, 
so I guess I should say that as well.

Q: Corruption occurs in noncapitalist countries, too.

A: Yeah, of course. But corruption to me isn’t a widespread issue. The 
conversation often is about Trump only being in power to enrich himself 
and make his business more profitable. Or back in the Iraq War days, it 
was, “Dick Cheney only did this war just to make money for Halliburton.” 
On the one hand, as a populist thing, they’re attacking the right 
enemies, so maybe it’s O.K., but, to me, it just isn’t the way society 
actually works. That was the point I was making, but I do think you’re 
right. There are other levels of corruption that don’t have to do with 
the things I said that we should obviously be on guard for, and that’s 
why we need transparency in government. If you’re running for public 
office, we should know your finances.

Q: Before we go, the Jacobin coverage of Venezuela was more positive 
during the Chavez regime and earlier in the Maduro regime. Has the way 
in which that situation has gone downhill made you think any differently 
about any conception of socialism, or about signs that people should be 
on the lookout for in leaders that you or other people on the left missed?

A: There was a lot of debate in the Latin American left about certain 
things that Venezuela was doing, as opposed to Bolivia and Ecuador. One 
is, Venezuela seemed to be breaking with some of the “neoliberal 
consensus” more than Bolivia and Ecuador, but doing it through using oil 
rents, and I think in the long run that probably created some more 
macroeconomic instability. In Bolivia and Ecuador there was a more 
conservative approach on some of the macroeconomic stuff, and that 
enabled them to create more stability in the long term.

You undermine a lot of the gains of your programs for workers if you’re 
also going to expose them to hyperinflation. That doesn’t make me some 
deficit hawk or austerity type to say that. I think there were 
macroeconomic mistakes. There was obviously, at times, an extremely 
right-wing opposition in Venezuela. There was a lot of political 
instability, some of it coming from the United States. I think as a 
whole, the mentality of the left has been to say that we in the U.S., a 
country that has been the perpetrator of so much injustice in Latin 
America and so many interventions, don’t have a right to critically look 
at states.

I meant that the way Chavez used rhetoric was more important than some 
people on the left maybe thought. Do you think that it’s worth paying 
attention to things like this and that we probably shouldn’t be totally 
surprised by how it played out?

When we were analyzing Venezuela, we analyzed it mostly through the 
populist tradition, saying that Venezuela was a manifestation of left 
populism. Maybe this is kind of an academic cop out, but I think some of 
the rhetoric Chavez was using, some of the approach from his government, 
the fact that he did have a segment of capital on his side, the fact 
that he would have all these military officers and a segment of state 
bureaucracy on his side, the fact that there wasn’t an active 
labor-backed party in Venezuela and whatever else, meant that we 
interpreted it all as, Hey listen, this is definitely redistributive. 
This is vaguely left. This guy seems good, so it’s good. This is a 
social movement if he says it is.

I guess the underlying point of your question is, Might creating this 
kind of polarization of us versus them, and pushing very hard to 
destabilize the country lead to that outcome? Burke had that one line, 
I’m paraphrasing very brutally, that the only thing worse than existing 
tyranny is a failed revolution against that tyranny. I think we always 
have to be on guard with what happens when our revolutions fail, because 
often it leads to a counterrevolution on the right or a situation of 
political paralysis. That can’t stop us from trying to make change, but 
I think a lot of the lesson of the last hundred years is to pay 
attention to unexpected outcomes and to construct policies in a way that 
makes sense.

Q: You talk about Sanders a bit at the end of your book. Is it fair to 
say that in your mind Sanders is a good democratic socialist, and Warren 
is a good social democrat?

A: I’m not sure if I would call Warren a social democrat, but in my mind 
she’s definitely the second-best in the field. I think the gap between 
Sanders and Warren and the gap between Warren and the rest of the field 
is equally significant. I think a lot of the things she’s proposing are 
great. I think she’s pushing the policy debate in a really good direction.

Q: Does any part of you ever think that someone like her being 
President, given how the government works, would actually be more 
effective for the left than someone like Sanders?

A: I see your argument. Let’s say you have a scenario where the world 
ends in eight years, and you’re talking about what can get passed within 
this next eight years. Then you would say that maybe Warren has certain 
skills that might be useful administrating the state. Maybe those skills 
exceed those of Sanders.

In my mind, thinking about politics over ten, fifteen, twenty years, 
someone with the strength and moral clarity of Sanders, with the ability 
to attract people to him and create a movement around him, can really 
create the conditions in which we’re not just writing policy but we’re 
changing the conditions in which policy is written. Does that make 
sense? I think Sanders is better at changing the conditions in which 
policy is written and being uncompromising in certain things in a way 
that is actually useful in the long term.

Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer at The New Yorker, where he is the 
principal contributor to Q. & A., a series of timely interviews with 
major public figures in politics, media, books, business, technology, 
and more.

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